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TRADEMARK LAW AND CONSUMER
CONSTRAINTS
Laura A. Heymann*

Trademark law’s focus is on the consumer. Both the trademark literature and the
marketing literature, however, tend to assume a consumer with few constraints on
economic or cognitive processing resources. For example, scholars have argued
that some confusion in the marketplace is not only inevitable but is also an overall
positive in that encountering confusion trains consumers to be more resourceful and
to learn how to interpret marketing communications more carefully. But not all
consumers have the same level of cognitive and economic resources. Disadvantaged
consumers—such as those not literate in the English language, those with lower
socioeconomic status, and those who face both constraints—might benefit or be
harmed by trademark law in ways that are different from the experiences of the
lawyers and judges who determine the results of trademark disputes. Drawing on
sociological and marketing literature to sketch a picture of the sometimes forgotten
consumer, this Article encourages courts to consider whether the consumers at issue
in a particular case face constraints that make it more difficult to engage with the
modern marketing system. Such consideration might not change the results of any
one case, but it will at least bring more attention to when some consumers are left
behind.
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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law’s focus is on the consumer. There are, to be sure, scholarly
debates about whether trademark law serves consumers or producers in practice—
in other words, whether trademark law is primarily about consumer protection,
primarily about protecting property, or some combination of the two.1 But the fact
that the touchstone of any trademark infringement case is whether the defendant’s
activities are likely to cause confusion means that trademark cases must consider
consumers’ beliefs and expectations arising from their encounters with the marks at
issue. Consumers are the ones who respond to trademark surveys; they are the ones
who must think a bit harder when faced with a diluted mark. As Barton Beebe has
written, trademark law requires the ability “to think through the consumer and see
the marketplace only as the consumer sees it.”2
Consumers are, of course, individually distinct, but “the consumer” in a
trademark case necessarily must be defined in some way. Courts have typically used
terms like “ordinary” or “reasonable” to characterize the consumer whose aptitude
in the marketplace is the focus of attention.3 Scholars have suggested, however, that
courts have varying conceptions of what constitutes reasonableness4—for example,
that courts conceive of consumers’ abilities differently when consumers are female
1.
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2006).
2.
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2020, 2022 (2005).
3.
See, e.g., Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d
532, 538–39 (2d Cir. 2005); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 502, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (“In weighing the evidence of likelihood of confusion, the
court must strive to place itself in the shoes of a prospective purchaser. In this role, the court
does not act as an enlightened educator of the public but takes into account the mythical
ordinary prospective purchaser’s capacity to discriminate as well as his propensity for
carelessness.”). Although I focus on judicial opinions in this Article, decisions from the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) can involve the same issues.
4.
See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 835 (2004) (“[T]he worldview of the ordinarily prudent consumer is
frequently based upon judicial assumptions.”) (emphasis omitted); see also FRANK
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 166
(1925) (“[T]he so-called ordinary purchaser changes his mental qualities with every
judge . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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as opposed to when they are male.5 Sustained attention to the conception of the
consumer in trademark law was given by Thomas Lee, Glenn Christensen, and Eric
DeRosia, who established a model of consumer sophistication to respond to what
they concluded was a lack of “any serious attempt to develop a framework for
understanding the conditions that may affect the attention that can be expected to be
given to a particular purchase.”6 As Barton Beebe has characterized it, courts view
the consumer as either a wholly rational “sovereign” or a highly susceptible “fool.”7
Despite this variability, it appears that most discussions of the consumer,
both in the trademark literature and in the marketing literature, assume a consumer
without economic or cognitive constraints.8 (I am using the phrase “cognitive
constraints” in its broadest sense to capture any challenges or constraints on
information processing and not as a synonym for intellectual ability.) For example,
scholars have argued—quite reasonably, as applied to some consumers—that some
confusion in the marketplace is not only inevitable but is also an overall positive in
that encountering confusion trains consumers to be more resourceful and to learn
how to “read” trademark communications more carefully.9 Michael Grynberg has
similarly argued that “the reasonable consumer of trademark should look more like
the reasonable person of tort,” such that consumers who are deemed to act
unreasonably when engaging with trademarks should be afforded little or no
protection.10 Such views seem to assume a baseline level of resources to engage in
5.
See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721,
723 (2004) (“Why, in trademark litigation decisions, do judges so often write about
representative members of the public as if we are astoundingly naïve, stunningly gullible, and
frankly stupid?”).
6.
Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks,
Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 575 (2008).
7.
Beebe, supra note 2, at 2024; see also Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer
Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 437–42 (2010) (describing courts’ views of
consumers in trademark cases).
8.
See, e.g., Natalie Ross Adkins & Julie L. Ozanne, The Low Literate Consumer,
32 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 93, 93 (2005) (noting that “consumer researchers assume that
consumers are literate, and our theories are generally developed using data from literate
consumers”); cf. Stephanie Plamondon Blair, Impoverished IP, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 523 (2020)
(considering how poverty can affect the ability to engage in creative decision-making).
9.
See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Constructive Role of Confusion in Trademark
Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85–86 (2014). I have made similar points in my own writing. Laura
A. Heymann, Reading the Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Literary Theory, 22 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 393 (2010) [hereinafter Heymann, Reading the Product]; Laura A. Heymann,
The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43
GA. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2009) [hereinafter Heymann, Public’s Domain] (noting that
trademarks rely on the consumer’s “associational dexterity”); cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799,
842 (favoring a rational-audience model in First Amendment jurisprudence to set “a minimum
standard of reasonableness to which all citizens are expected to conform regardless (for the
most part) of their actual capacity to do so”).
10.
Michael Grynberg, The Consumer’s Duty of Care in Trademark Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADEMARK LAW REFORM 326, 327 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis eds., 2021); id. at 339 (characterizing the “reasonably prudent” consumer as
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a search that one can ultimately choose to deploy (or not) in the quest to minimize
search costs.11
This view of the consumer is the natural heir to two traditions in the
literature. One is what Ronald Paul Hill has termed a “transnational consumer
culture”12—a culture that treats consumption not simply as a means of satisfying
basic human needs but as an activity to be purposefully engaged in, constructed, and
analyzed. (So too with advertising, which moved from simply telling consumers
about the characteristics of a product and the name of its maker to a profession and
the subject of scholarly attention.)13 This culture was centrally identified in, if not
born from, the work of Thorsten Veblen14 and continues through a literature that
analyzes the ways in which consumption is connected to identity development.15
The second tradition is the predominance in the trademark literature of a
law-and-economics approach to trademark law—the idea that trademarks’ primary
function is to reduce search costs for consumers in the marketplace. A consumer
who enjoys the taste of Pepsi can rely on the appearance of the Pepsi trademark, and
its use only by the PepsiCo company, to obtain Pepsi in the marketplace; she doesn’t
need to verify an ingredient list, confirm the place of manufacture, or request a
sample of the product before purchasing it.16 These two traditions, taken together in
terms of their relevance for trademark law, suggest that if the process of
consumption itself has value, the ideal is for the search that facilitates consumption
to be free from constraints.17 In other words, trademark law, and its goal of
eliminating consumer confusion in the pursuit of goods and services, implicitly
embodies the idea that, free from confusion, a consumer’s ability to pursue
consumption can proceed unfettered.
“one who understands the market in which he shops and is familiar with the tools available
to navigate it”).
11.
The classic description of trademarks as minimizing search costs is William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1987).
12.
Ronald Paul Hill, Consumer Culture and the Culture of Poverty: Implications
for Marketing Theory and Practice, 2 MKTG. THEORY 273, 275 (2002).
13.
See generally Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of
Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1 (2008).
14.
THORSTEN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899); see Austin,
supra note 4, at 851 n.107 (2004) (noting that the concept of conspicuous consumption existed
in the literature before Veblen’s work).
15.
Viviana A. Zelizer, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY
408 (2011) (discussing scholarship that “treats consumption as positional effort—
establishment of social location, boundaries, and hierarchies through the display of goods and
services” versus scholarship that “treats consumption as relational work—the creation,
maintenance, negotiation, and alteration of interpersonal connections through acquisition and
use of goods and services”).
16.
Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law,
98 VA. L. REV. 67, 73–77 (2012) (describing the broad acceptance of the search costs theory
in trademark law); id. at 82 (“[In a traditional passing off case,] consumers do not engage
trademark simply for the purpose of gaining abstract information. They use trademarks as
shorthands for information so that they can make purchasing decisions in the marketplace.”).
17.
Hill, supra note 12, at 275.
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Of course, for many in the United States, consumer choice is significantly
limited by constraints on cognitive or financial resources. Consumers whose native
language is English but who have never learned to read the language might find it
difficult to locate the products they want or be reluctant to try new products.
Consumers without disposable income or who rely on public assistance might be
constrained in the types of products they can buy, as are consumers who have limited
storage space in their dwellings, who rely on public transportation or walking to
reach stores, or who can shop only during limited hours between jobs. Indeed, the
lack of one set of resources can affect the other set, such as when limited financial
resources create a level of stress that impedes information processing.18 For all these
consumers, the idea of “search costs” takes on a different nuance and makes what
may seem unreasonable to another consumer quite reasonable under the
circumstances and vice versa. Thus, while conceptualizing trademark law “as a tool
for managing confusion in ways that help consumers develop the cognitive skills
necessary to support a complex market economy”19 might be entirely appropriate
for most consumers, it might not work that way for those without a financial cushion
for errors.
In previous work, I have noted the ways in which judges might interpret
trademarks through their own lens: they might see a printed trademark as tiny if they
themselves are of decreasing visual acuity or believe that two marks are not
confusing as long as they are pronounced “correctly.”20 As in that work, my goal
here is to broaden courts’ perspectives without necessarily making claims about the
results of any particular case. A broader perspective would recognize that every
trademark case has the potential to reflect the bias that some lawyers and judges
bring to the process of resolving disputes, even if unintended. That bias—of not
having experienced constraints on financial resources and of benefiting from formal
education—can be reflected in the language that is used to describe consumers, such
as “reasonable” or “sophisticated,” which implies that other consumers are
“unreasonable” or “unsophisticated” in their interactions in the marketplace, even if
those interactions are entirely rational under the circumstances.21 My discussion in
this Article is, therefore, to encourage a greater focus on variances in the purchasing
18.
See infra text accompanying notes 39–44.
19.
Yen, supra note 9, at 86.
20.
Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 781, 787–88, 790 (2008) (discussing Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) and SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 22–23 (2008) (describing
the move in the early- and mid-twentieth century to incorporate social science into trademark
law to counter the tendency of judges to assume that typical consumers thought like judges);
id. at 24–25 (describing how this made room for psychologists to claim the mantle of experts
in trademark cases, consistent with an increase in the use of psychology in advertising).
21.
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Dependence Effect, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
READER 20–25 (Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt eds., 2000) (1958); id. at 23 (“The fact
that wants can be synthesized by advertising, catalyzed by salesmanship, and shaped by the
discreet manipulations of the persuaders shows that they are not very urgent. A man who is
hungry need never be told of his need for food . . . . [Advertising is] effective only with those
who are so far removed from physical want that they do not already know what they want. In
this state alone, men are open to persuasion.”).
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experience, with particular attention to socioeconomic status and literacy, such that
advocates and decision-makers might see these various experiences as lived reality
rather than success or failure. The overall goal is, as Alan R. Andreasen noted in
1993, to “assume that the disadvantaged are acting rationally unless proven
otherwise,” given the circumstances they face.22
I am not suggesting, however, that trademark law can or should
accommodate every consumer experience at all times. Trademark law must make
some overall assumptions about how consumers will act in any given
circumstance.23 There will always be, as Michael Grynberg and Fred Yen have
reminded us,24 consumers who end up on the losing end, whether because they were
never confused in the first place (and so are being deprived of the defendant’s
product when infringement is found) or because they are indeed confused (and so
are not provided an effective remedy when infringement is not found). Trademark
doctrine, like any other doctrine, cannot be tailored to provide individual results.
That said, we should recognize that discussions about the breadth of trademark
protection should take full account of costs and benefits, just as discussions about
the “reasonable person” in tort law should acknowledge when, for example, that
standard is shaped in a particular way by gender, ability status, or other
characteristics.25 Thus, rather than characterizing interactions as those of the
“reasonable” consumer—which implies that other consumers are “unreasonable”—
courts might instead surface the characteristics of the consumer whom the court is
using as its yardstick.
I would be remiss here if I didn’t acknowledge prior trademark scholarship,
including my own, that has called for trademark law to recognize a model of the
consumer that credits the consumer with autonomy in decision-making.26 Such a
22.
Alan R. Andreasen, Revisiting the Disadvantaged: Old Lessons and New
Problems, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 270, 272 (1993).
23.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in
TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 140, 148 (Lionel Bently et al.
eds., 2008) (noting that the reasonable consumer must be “in large part a legal fiction that
implements a vision of the degree of consumer-protection regulation that Congress and the
courts think appropriate without rendering commerce inefficient”).
24.
Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60 (2008); Yen, supra note 9, at 85–109 (pointing out that in most litigated cases, the
plaintiff has put forward a plausible claim of consumer confusion; if the defendant prevails,
the court’s ruling “means that those consumers [who are confused] will continue to face
confusion until they figure things out for themselves”).
25.
Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard
in Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769, 769 (2001); cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 98 (Little, Brown & Co. 1881) (“The standards of the law are standards
of general application. The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament,
intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so different in
different men.”).
26.
Heymann, Reading the Product, supra note 9; Heymann, Public’s Domain,
supra note 9; McKenna, supra note 16, at 122 (“In the advertising context, construction of
consumers as autonomous agents capable of managing information leads to the conclusion
that law should regulate only false statements and that it should particularly avoid regulating
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consumer has the ability to learn that advertising sometimes contains puffery, that
claims to be the “world’s best” should be viewed with some skepticism,27 and that
communications to consumers sometimes contain jokes, humorous misdirection,
and parody. But there is a difference between avoiding paternalism and recognizing
the constant constraints on decision-making faced by some consumers. A theory of
human dignity should recognize the value of individual autonomy, but it should also
recognize the ways in which constraints affect the ability to exercise that autonomy.
Still, one might reasonably ask whether giving consideration to these issues
achieves anything of value. Although trademark law is rooted to some degree in
consumer protection, it can’t function as a vehicle for remedying all inequities in the
marketplace or substitute for broad-based social and economic policy. Additionally,
taking these challenges into account might result in a narrower scope for trademark
law in some instances but a broader scope in others. This might result, accordingly,
in undesirable consequences if trademark holders exploit the willingness of courts
to consider the socioeconomic reasons for consumer constraints to achieve unrelated
goals. And finally, one might contend that litigants in trademark cases are ordinarily
strategic enough that we can expect them to put forward any conception of the
consumer that enhances their chances of prevailing; the courts’ role is simply to
choose between these competing visions.
These contentions all have merit. But they seem to offer a somewhat too
sterile view of trademark law, one that can too easily gloss over consumers’ lived
experiences in favor of larger considerations. That is not to say the larger
considerations are irrelevant; one shouldn’t assume that shifting one’s viewpoint
will merely yield the same landscape in a different frame. But neither should one
pursue the larger doctrinal goals without an honest acknowledgment of who benefits
and who does not, beyond the parties on either side of the dispute.
I’ll begin with a note on terminology. Marketing scholars once used the
term “disadvantaged consumers” to describe consumers who faced resource
constraints in the marketplace. Scholars later took issue with this categorization
because it implied—to the extent “disadvantage” was framed in terms of race, age,
income, or other characteristics—that it was universal across the category and so
suggested immutability. These scholars proposed to use instead the term “vulnerable
consumers” as a way of focusing the analysis on the interactions consumers
experienced rather than on the consumer categorically.28 The term “vulnerability,”
attempts to persuade. A similar focus on consumer autonomy in the trademark context would
limit trademark law to circumstances in which use of a trademark is likely to deceive
consumers in ways that will affect their purchasing decision.”); id. at 137–38 (stating that
courts should “err on the side of less protection in close cases” involving private label goods
because “trademark law should not coddle consumers”).
27.
Cf. ELF (New Line Cinema 2003) (“You did it! Congratulations! World’s best
cup of coffee! Great job, everybody!”).
28.
Dennis E. Garrett & Peter G. Toumanoff, Are Consumers Disadvantaged or
Vulnerable? An Examination of Consumer Complaints to the Better Business Bureau, 44 J.
CONSUMER AFFS. 3, 5–6 (2010); Ronald Paul Hill & Eesha Sharma, Consumer Vulnerability,
30 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 551, 551 (2020) (defining consumer vulnerability “as a state in which
consumers are subject to harm because their access to and control over resources are restricted
in ways that significantly inhibit their ability to function in the marketplace”).
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however, presents its own challenges, as it may connote that all consumers under
constraints experience those constraints in the same way. Although I draw on the
literature from which this vocabulary has emerged, my goal here is to focus on the
constraints themselves.
Accordingly, in Part I of this Article, I’ll provide some information about
the cognitive and other constraints experienced by some consumers and describe
some of the ways in which such consumers navigate the marketplace. In Part II, I’ll
discuss the way that trademark law has generally characterized the consumer,
demonstrating that although the cases broadly categorize consumers as sophisticated
or unsophisticated (owing to an unfortunate phrasing in the formulation of the
likelihood of confusion tests), they do not as often discuss consumers in terms of the
constraints they may experience with respect to decision-making in the marketplace.
Part III considers several trademark doctrines that can be impacted by this failure to
give due consideration to consumer constraints, including the similarity of the marks
factor in the likelihood of confusion test, the question of private label goods, and the
doctrine of post-sale confusion. The Article then concludes.

I. HOW CONSUMERS CAN EXPERIENCE CONSTRAINTS
Before one can consider how trademark law might matter to consumers
who experience constraints, an acquaintance with the purchasing strategies of such
consumers is needed. At the outset, it should be noted that the research around such
strategies does not always reach the same conclusions and is often contextual,
consistent with the approach advocated for here. Different studies use different
definitions or variables for what constitutes socioeconomic status, including income,
education, and occupation as primary values, with parental education occasionally
thrown into the mix.29
I want to be clear about some points at the outset. First, neither
socioeconomic status (“SES”) categories nor purchasing experiences are rigid.
Many higher-SES consumers engage in purchasing experiences that are motivated
by obtaining value at the lowest possible cost; many lower-SES consumer
experiences involve seeking status or self-fulfillment as opposed to meeting basic
needs.
Second, and relatedly, I am not suggesting that even within a particular
category all consumers within that group will think or act alike. Indeed, the
marketing literature captures various narratives about the effects of financial or
cognitive constraints on consumers, some reporting that consumers with those
constraints experience difficulty in making decisions due to the cognitive stress that
a lack of resources puts on them, while others report that such consumers develop
strategic mechanisms to help them navigate the market given their lack of
resources.30 These two views can, of course, be reconciled to theorize a consumer
29.
See, e.g., Priya Fielding-Singh, A Taste of Inequality: Food’s Symbolic Value
Across the Socioeconomic Spectrum, 4 SOCIOECONOMIC SCI. 424, 427 (2017).
30.
Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976,
980 (2013) (“Being poor means coping not just with a shortfall of money, but also with a
concurrent shortfall of cognitive resources. The poor, in this view, are less capable not
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who succeeds in deploying coping mechanisms in some, but not all, instances, or a
consumer whose poverty-influenced cognitive load leads her to focus on certain
tasks or circumstances more deeply (for example, how her last twenty dollars for the
month will be spent) while neglecting other tasks.31 The descriptions in this Article
attempt to reflect these divergent views.
Third, although I discuss constraints both on finances and on information
processing in this Article, I am mindful that the groups of consumers who encounter
these constraints are not wholly coextensive, although they do overlap. Consumers
who are unable to process product labels in English because they are native speakers
of another language are different from consumers who cannot process such labels
because they are not literate in any language, even though they might face similar
interpretive challenges. But, I suspect, consumers in the former group who have
access to financial resources may be in a better position to ameliorate their
processing challenges than consumers who do not have such access.
The law-and-economics literature hypothesizes a consumer as a rational
actor: someone who seeks to maximize utility by acquiring desired goods at the
lowest available price.32 Such a consumer processes information efficiently and
accurately, has adequate time and resources for decision-making, and is not affected
by any cognitive biases or limitations. The behavioral economics literature, by
contrast, highlights the way in which consumers don’t always act in accordance with
what is deemed to be in their economic self-interest; beset by cognitive biases and
other constraints, they operate first through what Daniel Kahneman has
characterized as instinctive “System 1” thinking rather than through deliberative
“System 2” thinking.33 The question thus becomes whether we base law and policy
on how consumers should act or on how they actually do act—and, relatedly,

because of inherent traits, but because the very context of poverty imposes load and impedes
cognitive capacity.”); Adkins & Ozanne, supra note 8, at 93 (“Competing perspectives of the
low literate consumer as a flawed decision maker or a crafty market navigator are resolved
by the data; the consumers who accept the low literacy stigma are more victimized than the
consumers who fight against this label.”).
31.
Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 SCIENCE
682 (2012); see also Rebecca Hamilton et al., The Effects of Scarcity on Consumer Decision
Journeys, 47 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 546 (2019) (providing a robust overview of the literature
on scarcity); Eldar Shafir, Decisions in Poverty Context, 18 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 131, 132
(2017) (“Living in a context of scarcity and chaos, with no slack, where income instability
requires a constant juggling of pressing tasks, affects people’s attentional resources and
decisions. When you manage scarce resources, you need to do so with great care. You do not
have the luxury that abundance brings of being able to make mistakes.”).
32.
Stacey Dogan, Bounded Rationality, Paternalism, and Trademark Law, 56
HOUS. L. REV. 269, 277 (2018) (“In particular, the [economic model of trademark law] fails
to contemplate that trademarks might influence people to make purchasing decisions that
might not bring them the highest quality goods at the lowest available price—i.e., the selection
of the hypothetical rational actor.”).
33.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011). See generally,
e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998).
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whether basing legal rules on how consumers should act is intended to educate
consumers through norm development.34
But even if norm development is the goal of trademark law, such an effort
needs to take into account the constraints that consumers can have when engaging
in the marketplace, constraints that can serve as a limiting force on a consumer’s
ability to adopt such norms. The marketing literature reveals several ways in which
such consumers can experience setbacks in the consumption process.35 One is that
such consumers “may lack the skills, education, literacy or experience to gather the
requisite information to evaluate the relative quality of competitive products and
vendors in the market.”36 In the United States, more than 30 million adults don’t
have basic literacy skills in English, and more than 38 million individuals live in
poverty.37 (There has been, of course, a longtime, considerable overlap between the
two groups.38) These resource constraints can have multiple effects on the
purchasing experience. I describe a few of them below.
A. Valuation and Decision-Making
Stressors and concern over scarcity can create significant cognitive load
and negative psychological states, such as worry and guilt, that then have an effect
on decision-making.39 This, in turn, can result in a decreased ability to effectively
use working memory and engage in executive functions and may result in a tendency
toward impulsive decision-making.40 And because a trademark’s ability to function
as a cognitive shortcut depends on information retrieval from memory, increased
cognitive load can have an effect on an individual’s ability to recall details of a
trademark correctly, resulting in higher information-processing costs.41 As one team
34.

Yen, supra note 9, at 119–24 (applying Kahneman’s taxonomy to trademark

law).
35.
As discussed infra text accompanying notes 79–80, many marketing studies
are based on experiments or surveys conducted among a respondent group of university
students, who may or may not be representative of the populations about whom the studies
ultimately draw conclusions.
36.
Garrett & Toumanoff, supra note 28, at 7.
37.
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ADULT LITERACY IN THE
UNITED STATES, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/2019179.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWU8PKJM]; JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES:
2018,
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.html
[https://perma.cc/MJT6-KVHH].
38.
See, e.g., Adkins & Ozanne, supra note 8, at 94; Louise G. Richards,
Consumer Practices of the Poor, 3 WELFARE REV. 1, 5 (1965).
39.
Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The
Case of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans, in LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF MARKETING
THEORY (Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel eds.) (forthcoming 2022–23) (noting that “scarcity has
been shown to significantly reduce bandwidth and thus has implications on other cognitive
activity”).
40.
Matúš Adamkovič & Marcel Martončik, A Review of Consequences of Poverty
on Economic Decision-Making: A Hypothesized Model of a Cognitive Mechanism, 8
FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 8–9 (2017).
41.
Noel Capon & Marian Burke, Individual, Product Class, and Task-Related
Factors in Consumer Information Processing, 7 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 314, 315 (1980); see
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of researchers has noted, a comparison of brand preferences is fairly complex—it
requires that “equal amounts of information must be accessed on each brand, a series
of preferences developed, preferences stored on early searched brands while later
brands are searched, and, finally, a choice made among all brands.”42 This process
may also increase the importance of the trademark to the process of selecting goods
or services because investigating other sources of information (such as product
reviews) may prove to be too much of a resource drain on already overtaxed
cognitive loads. As a result, such consumers “may reduce their processing cost by
using brand name[s] as an information chunk”43 rather than relying on additional
sources of information. This might mean, for example, that once a reliable and
trustworthy brand has been found, consumers then rely on known food brand names
or known restaurant franchises to limit cognitive load or reduce the risk of spending
limited resources on an untested good or service.44
The consumer decision-making process may also be impacted by methods
of valuation related to one’s socioeconomic status. Researchers have determined,
for example, that scarcity of economic resources can affect the way that individuals
value items.45 Higher-SES individuals might rely more on external context to assess
also M. Viswanathan et al., Understanding the Influence of Literacy on Consumer Memory,
19 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 389, 396 (2009) (“[C]onsumers at the lowest level of literacy are
more sensitive to deviation from 1-to-1 correspondence with the real world than consumers
at higher levels of literacy.”).
42.
Capon & Burke, supra note 41, at 316; see also Lee et al., supra note 6, at 585
(noting that the consumer behavior literature identifies three steps in making a sourceidentification decision: (1) “gather product information that she considers of potential
relevance to the source-identification judgment”; (2) “comprehend the information”; and
(3) “identify the implications of the environmental information and integrate the implications
to form the source-identification judgment”).
43.
Capon & Burke, supra note 41, at 316; see also Adkins & Ozanne, supra note
8, at 98 (quoting a respondent describing her uncle’s habitual buying patterns: “He’s used to
buying Tide. And, if the store is out of Tide, and if he don’t see the box — he knows what
the color of the box is. But, if it’s not sitting on the shelf, he’ll just walk on by”).
44.
Cf., e.g., Douglas B. Holt, Does Cultural Capital Structure American
Consumption?, 25 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 1, 13 (1998) (discussing differences between
individuals who “find comfort in objects that are familiar” and consumers who “seek out and
desire exotic consumption objects”); see also Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 392–
93 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he reputations of expensive restaurants are largely made by critics and
guides. When a traveler visits a McDonald’s in Cincinnati, on the other hand, he is unlikely
to consult a guide; he relies on the reputation McDonald’s has acquired, its advertising and
his experience elsewhere.”). For a discussion on how a lack of formal education and
evaluative skills can affect the interpretation and understanding of product warnings, see
Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1226–27 (1994).
Brand loyalty can also derive from other types of lived experience. See Tressie
McMillan Cottom (@tressiemcphd), TWITTER (Jan. 26, 2021, 12:34 PM),
https://mobile.twitter.com/tressiemcphd/status/1354120500704927744
[https://perma.cc/
R3DJ-AVET] (“I also think about the unflagging generational inheritance of brand loyalty
among Black people, like that Esso example. The one shop or store or brand that half treated
us human one time becomes an institution.”).
45.
Anuj K. Shah, Eldar Shafir & Sendhil Mullainathan, Scarcity Frames Value,
26 PSYCH. SCI. 402 (2015).
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willingness to pay—for example, they would be willing to pay more for a bottle of
wine ordered at a restaurant than they would for that same bottle of wine purchased
at a supermarket. But for individuals with fewer economic resources, valuation
might depend on internal guidelines, such as trade-offs. That individual’s
willingness to pay may be less likely to differ based on where the purchase takes
place; because they think of the purchase as involving a trade-off (in terms of other
uses of that money), they are likely to have more consistent internal valuation of the
purchase.46 In this sense, an individual experiencing scarcity is making a more
economically rational choice than the individual who does not; after all, why should
one experience a dramatically different willingness to pay for the same item
depending on where it is purchased?
Additionally, the time spent on decision-making in the marketplace may be
influenced not only by actual constraints on time—for example, limited nonworking
hours or the need to arrange shopping around bus schedules—but also by cognitive
pressures that constrain long-term decision-making and planning. Many are
familiar, for example, with the “marshmallow test,” conducted at Stanford
University in the early 1970s, which purported to test the ability of young children
to delay gratification.47 The children in the experiment were told that they could
have a single treat (such as a marshmallow) immediately; however, if they waited
for a period of time, they would get two treats. The researcher then left the room,
and the children were observed to see whether they would wait or not. The original
study concluded that children who were able to delay gratification demonstrated
enhanced willpower and so tended to have better life outcomes as determined by a
variety of measures.48 A 2018 revisiting of the marshmallow test, however,
concluded that the ability to delay gratification was not itself a predictor of life
outcomes; it was a reflection of them.49 Children from lower-SES families, as one
writer summarizing the study wrote, “would be less motivated to wait for that second
marshmallow” because “[f]or them, daily life holds fewer guarantees: There might
be food in the pantry today, but there might not be tomorrow, so there is a risk that
comes with waiting.”50
46.
See id. at 404–06; Hamilton et al., supra note 31, at 546 (“[B]ecause
consumers who experience resource scarcity of money are more sensitive to opportunity costs
than affluent consumers, they may scrutinize deals more carefully . . . .”).
47.
Walter Mischel & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Attention in Delay of Gratification, 16 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 329 (1970).
48.
Id.
49.
Tyler W. Watts et al., Revisiting the Marshmallow Test: A Conceptual
Replication Investigating Links Between Early Delay of Gratification and Later Outcomes,
29 PSYCH. SCI. 1159, 1175 (2018).
50.
Jessica McCrory Calarco, Why Rich Kids Are So Good at the Marshmallow
Test, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/06/
marshmallow-test/561779/ [https://perma.cc/EG5M-DRSA]; see also Edna R. Sawady &
Jennifer Tescher, Financial Decision Making Processes of Low-Income Individuals, in
BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 92, 96–97 (Nicolas P.
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008) (“We observed poverty to be accompanied by
constantly changing and frequently unpredictable circumstances. Incomes fluctuate,
permanent assets are few, jobs change, work availability often changes, family structures
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Trademarks can also play a particular role in the communication of status
for some consumers. The phenomenon that the acquisition and possession of certain
goods indicates one’s social status relative to others is as old as sumptuary codes.51
Thorsten Veblen is typically credited with giving this acquisition process a name
when he referred to it as “conspicuous consumption” in 1899,52 and much scholarly
attention has been devoted since then to discussing its effects and value. In thinking
about consumers in this regard, it is useful to pay attention to the intersectionality
between status and limited financial resources.53 For example, one researcher who
investigated parents’ practices around the purchase of food for their children found
that for the low-SES parents she studied, “food serves as a symbolic antidote to a
context of deprivation.”54 Such parents are often not able to provide their children
with particular desired goods, but acquiescing to their children’s requests for certain
brands of food products (such as going to Starbucks rather than purchasing coffee
drinks at a less expensive establishment) is seen as a way to communicate care and
love and provide a measure of dignity to their children, even if that means going
without other purchases. For example, in discussing the practices of one woman in
the study, the researcher wrote:
A key component of Nyah’s survival involved consistently denying
her adolescents’ requests for indulgences. Within this context of
ongoing refusals of larger purchases and investments—such as
enrollment in sports camps and arts programs—Nyah found that food
offered a chance to say “yes” to her adolescents. Thus, Nyah and
other low-SES parents aspired to grant their adolescents’ food
requests often.55
change, money comes and goes. Within this context, it is not surprising that short-term focus
prevails.”).
51.
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 812 (2010) (“A society’s sumptuary code is its system of
consumption practices, akin to a language (or at least ‘a set of dialects’), by which individuals
in the society signal through their consumption their differences from and similarities to
others.”) (footnotes omitted).
52.
VEBLEN, supra note 14.
53.
One study used Google Correlate to identify 40 search terms most positively
correlated with the study’s measure of income inequality and 40 terms most negatively
correlated; using Amazon Mechanical Turk, the researchers then asked respondents whether
those terms were related to status goods (defined to respondents as “things that show how
rich or successful [people] are compared to other people”). The researchers concluded that
“search terms that occur with relatively higher frequency in states with greater residual
income inequality are more likely to concern status goods—designer brands, expensive
jewelry, and so forth—than no status goods.” The researchers acknowledged that search may
not lead to purchase, but they concluded that search does involve the cost of “additional
cognitive resources and time” at the expense of other activities. Lukasz Walasek & Gordon
D.A. Brown, Income Inequality and Status Seeking: Searching for Positional Goods in
Unequal U.S. States, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 527, 528–29, 532 (2015).
54.
Fielding-Singh, supra note 29, at 424. The study concluded that access to
sources of healthy food was not a contributing factor in the population studied. Id. at 431.
55.
Id. at 433; see also Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest
in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727 (1999) (“Ask a child, and he’ll persuade
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By contrast, this researcher continued, high-SES parents use the denial of
their children’s requests for particular food items as a way of enacting what they see
as good parenting practices, teaching their children better nutrition habits and the
value of delayed gratification.56 (The study concluded that middle-SES parents
engage in both strategies.57) For example, in describing the practices of another
woman in the study, identified as high-SES, the researcher wrote:
Similar to Nyah, Heather cared about the food that her adolescents
consumed and derived a sense of worth as a caregiver from her food
provisioning. However, Heather’s socioeconomic position altered the
symbolic meanings she attached to food. Absent concerns about
providing enough, Heather derived feelings of provider worth
through teaching Jane and Evan how and when to eat the “right”
foods for the “right” reasons. Food was less so a compensatory
medium and more so a means through which to instill in her
adolescents classed values about restraint and delayed gratification.58

Thus, comparing the two women in the study, the parent identified as highSES did not use food brands as a way of communicating caring to her children; her
concern was about the nutritional composition of the food her children ate (although
perhaps mediated through trademarks—i.e., “We don’t eat food from McDonald’s
in this family”59). But for the parent identified as low-SES, the trademark was the
way that her child communicated her emotional needs and the way that the parent
responded to those needs. In that family relationship, no generic substitute would
suffice.
This plays out in other areas as well. Although some scholars have written
about the way that purchases of branded status goods can work as a “compensatory
behavior aimed at restoring self-integrity” and ameliorating psychological pain,60
such activity is not always (and perhaps not often) purely about aspirational social
positioning—the psychological rewards that motivate a “desire to be thought of as
a member of a higher social class.”61 It is, instead, about strategically engaging the
presumptions and prejudices of others to achieve employment or other outcomes.
Sociologist Tressie McMillan Cottom has written compellingly about how, for some
individuals, wearing a recognizable designer outfit or carrying a particular handbag
you that the difference between a box of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes with a picture of Batman on
it and some other box without one is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. It has nothing
to do with the way the cereal tastes. What kids want isn’t a nutritious part of a complete
breakfast; they want Batman to have breakfast with them.”).
56.
Fielding-Singh, supra note 29, at 436.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 436.
59.
For the complicated interrelationship between McDonald’s and Black
communities, see MARCIA CHATELAIN, FRANCHISE: THE GOLDEN ARCHES IN BLACK AMERICA
(2020).
60.
Niro Sivanathan & Nathan C. Pettit, Protecting the Self Through
Consumption: Status Goods as Affirmational Commodities, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
564, 569 (2010).
61.
Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381,
1408 (2005) (discussing Veblen).
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is a way to signal to gatekeepers that you are acceptable—that you are entitled to a
certain job, to benefits, or to other things that would otherwise be denied to you.62
She writes, relating her own experience:
[A] hiring manager at my first professional job looked me up and
down in the waiting room, cataloging my outfit, and later told me that
she had decided I was too classy to be on the call center floor. I was
hired as a trainer instead. The difference meant no shift work, greater
prestige, better pay, and a baseline salary for all my future
employment.63

This may also explain, for example, parents of more limited means who
nevertheless buy each of the branded products on the elementary school back-toschool shopping list. Having those items is not a matter of satisfying psychological
desires; it is seen as the line between success and failure for their child in the
classroom in an environment lacking other safety nets.64 Decision-making for some
consumers is, therefore, more complicated than a basic model of “search costs”
might suggest.
B. Access to Modes of Shopping
An additional challenge for some consumers is that they “may lack the
mobility to travel to shop at more attractive and desirable stores.”65 The relatively
62.
TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, The Price of Fabulousness, in THICK 152, 165
(2019) (“Why do poor people make stupid, illogical decisions to buy status symbols? For the
same reason all but only the most wealthy buy status symbols, I suppose. We want to belong.
And, not just for the psychic rewards, but belonging to one group at the right time can mean
the difference between unemployment and employment, a good job as opposed to a bad job,
housing or a shelter, and so on.”). By focusing on income inequality here, I do not intend to
diminish the intersectionality at work in some of these interactions. See, e.g., Sterling A. Bone
et al., Rejected, Shackled, and Alone: The Impact of Systemic Restricted Choice on Minority
Consumers’ Construction of Self, 41 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 451, 460 (2014) (describing
strategies used by Black and Hispanic consumers in visiting banks to secure business loans,
including “dressing up, wearing a suit, wearing a tie, and carrying a briefcase to signal to
lenders their professionalism and credit worthiness”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63.
COTTOM, supra note 62, at 166.
64.
See, e.g., Janice Posada, The Brand-Name Game, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug.
23, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2006-08-23-0608
230159-story.html [https://perma.cc/UJ37-ZR5D] (“School officials in West Hartford say
they will sometimes recommend a brand-name item based on its perceived quality and a
desire for classroom standardization, which can make some tasks, from writing to calculating,
easier.”) Perhaps relatedly, one Idaho school district in 2017, in response to a court ruling
holding certain public-school fees to violate the Idaho Constitution’s requirement of a
“general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools,” revised its school
supply list to eliminate brand names. Joki v. Idaho, No. CV OC 2012 17745 (4th Dist. Ct.
Nov. 2015); Julie Wootton-Greener, School Supply Lists: Fewer Classroom Items and Brand
Names, MAGIC VALLEY (Aug. 2, 2017), https://magicvalley.com/news/local/education/
school-supply-lists-fewer-classroom-items-and-brand-names/article_63044a3e-505d-56a692df-0ca7460c0bbd.html [https://perma.cc/DFH2-7XV7].
65.
Garrett & Toumanoff, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that interactions in the
market for vulnerable consumers may involve “discriminatory practices, higher prices and
lower levels of customer service”).
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low number of supermarkets in or near low-income neighborhoods has been
documented enough to earn the name “food deserts” for such areas.66 Consumers
living in those areas without access to means of traveling elsewhere must rely on
smaller convenience stores or groceries without the same range of products that one
would find in a larger supermarket.67 Additionally, without access to transport by
car, purchases must be limited to what can be carried while walking or traveling on
a bus, which both limits the nature of one’s purchases and makes one disinclined to
return items mistakenly acquired.
Considerations of purchasing experiences must also include what happens
when a purchase is unsatisfactory. While the typical consumer might be expected to
have some agency in pursuing resolution for dissatisfaction, other consumers “may
lack the resources needed to seek appropriate redress” for any dissatisfaction with
the purchasing experience.68 For example, returning to a store to exchange or
complain about a mistaken or unsatisfying purchase requires an additional
investment of time and resources that might not be available; a consumer who has
spent an hour on a bus to make the purchase in the first place may well be disinclined
to spend another hour returning to the store to exchange the product she didn’t
want—putting aside the additional time spent standing in line.69 Such consumers
might also, as a psychological matter, resign themselves to expect different
treatment based on previous interactions with merchants, government officials, and
the like70 or may lack a sense of self-identity that fosters the ability to think of
oneself as an individual entitled to assert preferences.71
The move in recent years to e-commerce has not necessarily made things
more equitable. While online shopping may help a consumer to avoid the indignities

66.
See, e.g., Hamilton et al., supra note 31, at 533.
67.
Kelly J. Clifton, Mobility Strategies and Food Shopping for Low-Income
Families: A Case Study, 23 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 402, 403 (2004).
68.
Garrett & Toumanoff, supra note 28, at 7; id. at 8 (noting that “[a] number of
prior studies have shown that lower-income consumers are less likely than higher-income
consumers to engage in any form of complaining behavior”); id. at 17 (believing income to
be “the primary determinant of complaining behavior” as a result of the article’s study).
69.
On the socioeconomic and psychological effects of waiting (and the
relationship of waiting to power), see Barry Schwartz, Waiting, Exchange, and Power: The
Distribution of Time in Social Systems, 79 AM. J. SOC. 841 (1974).
70.
Madhubalan Viswanathan et al., Decision Making and Coping of Functionally
Illiterate Consumers and Some Implications for Marketing Management, 69 J. MKTG. 15, 26–
27 (2005) (concluding that low-income, literate consumers are “more willing to be
confrontative and to demand different treatment from store personnel” than functionally
illiterate consumers, who tend to “accept[ ] the status quo of being treated differently as a
metalevel coping strategy”).
71.
Adkins & Ozanne, supra note 8, at 98–99 (characterizing some low-literate
consumers as isolated and dependent on others, and thus “disempowered in the
marketplace . . . making mistakes” and others as adopting a strategy of concealing their
illiteracy to fit in; “[their] assured and critical stance is also manifest in complaining behavior
over poor service, poor quality products, and market practices”).
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that can attend in-person interactions,72 it requires, of course, a reliable and
sufficiently fast internet connection as well as access to a credit card or other means
of online payment. A 2017 study reported that 40% of internet users with less than
a high-school degree buy products online, compared to 91% of college graduates;
60% of internet users living in households earning less than $20,000 per year buy
products online compared to 89% of those in households earning $100,000 or more
per year.73 This likely relates, at least in part, to the inequitable availability of
broadband internet services across the country. A 2019 report from the Federal
Communications Commission indicated that 21.3 million Americans lacked a
connection of at least 25 Mbps/3 Mbps (download/upload), the accepted definition
of a broadband connection, at the end of 2017.74 (Three Commissioners took issue
with these numbers, asserting that the report’s figures were too low.)75 In addition,
many consumers who do have access to reliable internet services access the Internet
primarily through mobile devices,76 which changes the nature of the online
72.
Bone et al., supra note 62, at 452 (investigating “systemic restricted choice”
based on race and ethnicity, defined as “choice [that] occurs when a consumer is motivated
to choose, construes the choice as salient and self-relevant, but cannot finalize the choice
because of individual characteristics beyond his or her control that circumscribe his or her
ability to make marketplace choices”); Garrett & Toumanoff, supra note 28, at 7.
73.
MARY MADDEN, DATA & SOC’Y, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND DIGITAL
INEQUALITY: HOW TECHNOLOGY EXPERIENCES AND RESOURCES VARY BY SOCIOECONOMIC
STATUS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY 44 (2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/
09/DataAndSociety_PrivacySecurityandDigitalInequality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KTZ8VR5B].
74.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC NO. 19-44, 2019 BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT
REPORT 2 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-44A1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5A9U-J8XY] (noting that while the number of Americans with access to at least 250
Mbps/25Mbps broadband grew in 2017 by more than 36%, 21.3 million Americans lacked a
connection of at least 25 Mbps/3Mbps at the end of 2017); id. at 42 (noting that “six percent
of Americans, over 19 million households, lack access to fixed terrestrial advanced
telecommunications capability”; the percentage is 24% in rural areas and 32% in tribal lands).
75.
Id. at 322 (statement of Comm’r Michael O’Rielly) (criticizing the report’s
failure to consider fixed and mobile broadband as a single market, noting that “[d]ata show
that fixed and mobile service are undoubtedly substitutable for many Americans”); id. at 325
(statement of Comm’r Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting) (stating that the report’s conclusion
that “broadband deployment is reasonable and timely throughout the United States . . . will
come as news to millions and millions of Americans who lack access to high-speed service
at home” and “to urban areas where redlining has led to broadband deserts”; stating that
because of errors in methodology, “the claim in this report that there are only 21 million
people in the United States without broadband is flawed” and pointing to another analysis
that “concluded that as many as 162 million people across the country do not use internet
service at broadband speeds”); id. at 327 (statement of Comm’r Geoffrey Starks, dissenting)
(dissenting on similar grounds).
76.
MADDEN, supra note 73, at 38 (reporting results of a 2015 survey indicating
that among Americans living in households earning less than $20,000 per year, 64% use the
Internet or email (compared to 96% of those earning $100,000 or more per year)); id. (noting
relevance of age to these results); id. at 8, 41 (noting of the 44% earning less than $20,000
per year who own a smartphone, 63% report accessing the Internet primarily from their
phone); id. at 42 (reporting that 73% of smartphone owners with less than a high-school
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purchasing experience, both in terms of design and in terms of whether access is via
an unlimited plan or is metered in some way.77 For consumers who rely on public
benefits, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), another
limitation comes from the fact that only certain retailers are permitted to accept
SNAP benefits for online purchase of food items, although this appears to be
improving.78
Thus, to the extent trademark law uses the nature of the consumer
purchasing experience to draw conclusions about confusion, it is worth questioning
whether the assumed model of that experience matches reality for all consumers.
C. Gaining Information About Consumer Constraints
Finally, it should not go unnoticed that methods of gaining information
about consumer behavior—whether in the scholarship or the courtroom—often
yield information primarily regarding literate consumers with financial resources.
Many marketing studies are based on experiments or surveys conducted among a
respondent group of university students,79 who are not always representative of the
larger population in terms of income, educational level, and other characteristics—
a fact that some studies have acknowledged.80 Using controlled studies to draw
degree access the Internet primarily from their phones); see also MONICA ANDERSON, PEW
RSCH. CTR., MOBILE TECHNOLOGY AND HOME BROADBAND 2019, at 2–3 (June 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/06/13/mobile-technology-and-home-broadband-2019/
[https://perma.cc/MLS5-JVN6] (reporting that 37% of U.S. adults use primarily a smartphone
to access the Internet and that 27% reported that they did not subscribe to broadband service
at home, with 21% of those respondents citing cost as the primary reason); id. at 4 (reporting
that 92% of adults from households earning $75,000 or more per year have broadband service
at home, while only 56% of those in households earning $30,000 or less do). For a narrative
report on the effects of lack of internet service during the pandemic, see Cecilia Kang, Parking
Lots Have Become a Digital Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/05/technology/parking-lots-wifi-coronavirus.html#:~:text=Revis%20and%20many
%20others%20across,have%20kept%20their%20signals%20on
[https://perma.cc/QX3ETAQK] (describing individuals who worked from their cars in order to access hotspots).
77.
An online purchase also typically involves delivery, which, in turn, requires
an address to which items can be shipped and safely retrieved. Thanks to Ronald Paul Hill for
raising this point.
78.
The SNAP Online Purchasing Pilot launched in April 2019 and is, as of this
writing, operational in all states and the District of Columbia except Alaska, Montana, and
Louisiana. Both Amazon and Walmart are approved retailers. FNS Launches the Online
Purchasing Pilot, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/online-purchasingpilot [https://perma.cc/D2ZF-TTDB] (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). SNAP is the program
formerly known as “food stamps.” Benefits are provided to recipients each month on an
electronic benefits transfer (“EBT”) card; paper coupons are no longer used.
79.
See Robert A. Peterson, On the Use of College Students in Social Science
Research: Insights from a Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 28 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 450, 451
(2001) (noting the increasing percentage of scholarly articles on consumer research that
employ college students as subjects).
80.
Some of these acknowledgments use the dated language of the time. See, e.g.,
Ben M. Enis, Keith K. Cox & James E. Stafford, Students as Subjects in Consumer Behavior
Experiments, 9 J. MKTG. RSCH. 72, 72 (1972) (noting, in 1972, that most undergraduate
business students were male and that “[t]he consumer of interest in many marketing studies
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conclusions about consumer behavior also risks minimizing the cognitive and other
restraints that some consumers face, such as stressors, limited time for decisionmaking, and consideration of real-life trade-offs in financial resources. Failure to
take these same limitations into account must also be considered during litigation.
The comparison of two trademarks in the quiet, reflective environment of a
courtroom, where the marks are often presented side by side, may not be
representative of any consumer experience, let alone the experiences of consumers
facing constraints.
Social media is increasingly becoming a way of gaining information about
consumer attitudes. Litigants now submit evidence derived from Twitter, Yelp, and
other sites to support claims of consumer confusion (or lack thereof).81 But even if
the use of social media more generally is distributed across various socioeconomic
groups, this may not be true of particular social media sites. For example, according
to information provided by Yelp as of September 2021, 88% of U.S. Yelp users have
a college degree, and 79% of U.S. Yelp users have an annual income of $60,000 or
above.82 This tracks the results of one study on the usefulness of complaints on Yelp
to track food-borne illnesses, which noted a positive correlation between variables
associated with affluence (such as income and education) and the number of such
reports in a particular geographic area.83 This suggests that to the extent Yelp
reviews are representative of consumer experiences at all, they are likely
representative only of the experiences of some demographic groups, and the same
is likely true of at least some other social media sites.
Another consideration is the way in which information about consumer
attitudes is gained during litigation—i.e., through consumer surveys. Before the
internet age, consumer surveys were frequently done either through telephone or
through mall-intercept procedures. Both forms engage consumers who have the time
and resources to respond to a survey (including jobs that allow one to structure one’s
own workday); the latter additionally engages a population that (assuming the
survey is conducted during daytime hours) has the ability to visit a shopping center
during the day and to take the time necessary to participate in the survey.84 To the
is the housewife”); id. at 73 (reporting inconclusive results of a study comparing responses of
the two groups and encouraging further research in the area); see also Hamilton et al., supra
note 31, at 543–44 (advising that researchers use creative strategies to study consumers
experiencing severe resource scarcity); Viswanathan et al., supra note 41, at 392 (noting that
researchers studying low-literacy individuals must take care in administering studies to avoid
causing anxiety).
81.
See, e.g., Museum of Modern Art v. MOMACHA IP LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d
361, 378–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (using social media posts, including on Yelp, as evidence of
actual confusion). See generally Alexandra J. Roberts, Mark Talk, 39 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1001 (2021).
82.
Fast Facts, YELP, https://www.yelp-press.com/company/fast-facts/default.
aspx [https://perma.cc/Q66J-H42T] (last visited Dec. 7, 2021).
83.
Samuel Henly et al., Disparities in Digital Reporting of Illness: A
Demographic and Socioeconomic Assessment, 101 PREVENTIVE MED. 18, 19 (2017).
84.
While survey participants may be compensated for their time in the form of a
low-value gift card—which may, for some participants, represent a higher dollar value than
their hourly wage—that payment does not compensate for the risk of losing one’s job for
failure to return to work after a trip to the mall.
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extent that more surveys are conducted online, the results may be skewed in favor
of individuals who access the Internet through a computer rather than via their
phones and who have the literacy and other skills to fully participate.
With this background in mind, I now turn to how trademark law has
traditionally described the consumer.

II. TRADEMARK LAW’S CONCEPTION OF THE CONSUMER
Trademark law’s conception of the consumer has evolved along with the
evolution of marketing practices. Changes in modern consuming and marketing
practices have created a world in which consumers who once bought largely
unbranded goods from a single trusted merchant (the local general store) now shop
in retail environments with multiple brands of the same product, fluctuating prices
depending on location or timing, and much more self-reliance in the selection of
goods.85 Accordingly, courts have had to determine whether this modern form of
marketing has yielded a savvy consumer or a burdened consumer and, relatedly,
what vocabulary courts will use to describe them.86
Although conceptions of the consumer pervade trademark law doctrine,
they appear most prominently during the likelihood of confusion analysis in a
trademark infringement case. The Lanham Act provides, in cases involving
infringement of a registered mark or an unregistered mark, that the cause of
actionable harm is a use that is likely to cause confusion as to the relationship
between the defendant’s goods or services and the plaintiff’s goods or services.87
Because the extent of actual confusion in the future is not always known,
predictable, or measurable, federal courts use a multifactor test to determine whether
confusion is likely. Although the phrasing of the factors differs from circuit to
circuit, there is general uniformity among the circuits in the substance of the factors
that are considered. I’ll discuss one factor—the similarity of the marks—in Section
III.A. Here, I want to focus on another factor—what most circuits term “the
85.
Austin, supra note 4, at 912–13; Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 13–14; Deven
R. Desai, The Chicago School Trap in Trademark: The Co-Evolution of Corporate, Antitrust,
and Trademark Law, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 551, 591 (2015).
86.
See Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 10–11 (describing a shift in courts’ views
of the reasonable purchaser in the early 1900s from one who engaged in “careful inspection”
to one who was “not expected to exercise a high degree of caution”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Austin, supra note 4, at 836 (noting that the history of consumer movements in the
United States “reveals numerous examples of American consumers exhibiting quite
sophisticated attitudes towards branded products”); cf. Lidsky, supra note 9, at 820 (“[T]he
implied audience construct is an excellent vehicle for parsing commercial speech
jurisprudence, since the shift from a credulous consumer model to a savvy shopper model
largely explains the Court’s increasing protection of commercial speech.”).
87.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (imposing liability for a use of a registered mark in
commerce “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive”); id. § 1125(a) (imposing liability for a use of, inter alia, any
“word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that is “likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person”).
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sophistication of the consumer”—as an overall conception of the consumer.
Consumer “sophistication” might be conceived of as a proxy for consumer
confusion in the marketplace, in that consumers who are more “sophisticated” are
less likely to be confused between two trademarks, and vice versa. But
“sophistication” is a rather inapt word to describe the work that this factor should be
doing. To help explain this assertion, I’ll begin by tracing the development of this
factor in the caselaw.
The development of the multifactor test to determine trademark
infringement is often traced to the Second Circuit’s 1961 opinion in Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Electronics Corp.88 Polaroid involved a dispute between the plaintiff, a
manufacturer of goods related to optics and photography (sold under the trademark
Polaroid), and the defendant, a manufacturer of microwave devices and television
studio equipment (sold under the trademark Polarad).89 Unlike other trademark
disputes, the parties in this case were not direct competitors, and so any sales made
by the defendant under the mark Polarad did not divert profits from the plaintiff. If
the court had followed cases such as Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed
Milk Co.,90 this would have resulted in a denial of relief to the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, although the case was ultimately resolved on a theory of
laches,91 the Polaroid court explained how to determine when actionable harm was
likely to occur in cases involving noncompeting goods. Notably, the Second Circuit
did not feel the need to discuss the nature of the harm. The district court had noted
that the plaintiff’s own witnesses had conceded that the defendant had not engaged
in passing off and that the plaintiff had not suffered from any diversion of sales; it
further noted that the plaintiff had not shown that it had suffered any reputational
harms.92 It nevertheless went on to consider the evidence as to confusion, ultimately
concluding that differences in the types of products, the methods of advertising, and
the nature of their markets meant that confusion was not likely.93 The Second Circuit
likewise did not identify the relationship between consumer confusion and any harm
suffered by the plaintiff, although it did cite cases suggesting that the harm in cases
of unrelated goods lies largely in the effects on the plaintiff’s reputation caused by
consumer confusion as to the relationship between the defendant’s goods and the
plaintiff, as well as preventing the plaintiff from expanding to provide the types of
88.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). For a
discussion of the Polaroid test, and its place in the development of trademark infringement
doctrine, see Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”:
Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307,
1331–32 (2012).
89.
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 494.
90.
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir.
1912).
91.
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 493 (“We find it unnecessary to pass upon [the district
court’s] conclusion that defendant’s use of Polarad does not violate any of plaintiff’s rights.
For we agree that plaintiff’s delay in proceeding against defendant bars plaintiff from relief
so long as defendant’s use of Polarad remains as far removed from plaintiff’s primary fields
of activity as it has been and still is.”).
92.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y.
1960), aff’d, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
93.
Id. at 354–55.
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goods sold by the defendant.94 Thus, although the case has come to be known as one
of the key cases setting forth the factors indicating when consumer confusion is
likely, the case did not itself explain why consumer confusion, as such, was a
relevant consideration.
The court did provide guidance on what it characterized as the “vexing”
problem of “determining how far a valid trademark shall be protected with respect
to goods other than those to which its owner has applied it.”95 In such cases, the
court suggested, the answer should depend on several factors:
the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of
defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of
defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers.96
The court did not define what it meant by “sophistication of the buyers,” but from
the court’s citation to §§ 729, 730, and 731 of the First Restatement of Torts,97 it
seems evident that the court meant not whether the consumer was intelligent or
educated—in other words, not whether the typical consumer could be characterized
as “sophisticated” in the abstract—but rather the nature and frequency of the
consumer’s experience with the good in question, the familiarity that the consumer
would develop with the good as a consequence, and thus the likelihood that the
94.
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 496 (first citing Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d
972 (2d Cir. 1928); then citing L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d. Cir. 1934);
then citing Triangle Pub., Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d. Cir. 1948); and then citing
Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953)). Of the cases cited, Yale Electric
is perhaps the best known on the question of the reputational harm in the case of
noncompeting goods:
[I]t was at first a debatable point whether a merchant’s good will,
indicated by his mark, could extend beyond such goods as he sold. How
could he lose bargains which he had no means to fill? What harm did it
do a chewing gum maker to have an ironmonger use his trade-mark? The
law often ignores the nicer sensibilities.
However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may
have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field
of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation,
whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury,
even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its
use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator,
and another can use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized
that, unless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to insure
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful.
Yale Elec., 26 F.2d at 973–74. On the question of whether preservation of future markets is a
legitimate goal for trademark law, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning
Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 (2010).
95.
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
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consumer would be deceived by similar marks or trade dress from another
producer.98 To this end, § 731 of the Restatement gives the example of “expert
buyers employed by department stores” as contrasted with “the persons who buy at
department stores,”99 the assumption being that the expertise and motivation of the
former to select products carefully militates against the possibility of mistake.100 As
the Fourth Circuit later confirmed:
Barring an unusual case, buyer sophistication will only be a key
factor when the relevant market is not the public at-large. If the
typical consumer in the relevant market is sophisticated in the use
of—or possesses an expertise regarding—a particular product,
such sophistication or expertise may be pertinent in determining
the likelihood of confusion.101
As suggested by the Restatement’s summary, this distinction was evident
in older cases. In Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Hynes,102 an 1884 federal district
court case in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from using a star as
a mark for its plug tobacco, the court began by noting that the plaintiff’s mark and
the defendant’s mark need not have been identical for infringement to be found; it
was enough if the two marks were similar enough to deceive an “ordinary
purchaser,” giving “such attention to the same as such a purchaser usually gives, and
to cause him to purchase the one supposing it to be the other.”103 In particular, the
court went on to note, the resemblance need not be such “as would deceive experts,
persons, because of their peculiar knowledge from their being wholesale or retail
dealers, or in any other way specially conversant with the trade-mark simulated”; it
was enough if the “public generally” was misled.104 Thus, in the case at hand, the
court noted that a tobacco devotee, “looking for his favorite brand,” might notice a
difference between the two marks, “just as the man of luxurious tastes would discern

98.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 729 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1938) (“The
buying habits of the purchasers of the particular goods in question are also significant. If the
goods are bought by purchasers who exercise considerable attention and inspect fairly closely,
the likelihood of confusion is smaller than when the goods are bought by purchasers who
make little or no inspection. These factors are related aspects of the particular circumstances
under which the goods in question are marketed.”).
99.
Id. § 731 cmt. e (“[T]he greater the attention exercised by purchasers and the
more they subject the goods and their trade symbols, labels and dress to inspection, the smaller
the likelihood of such association. Thus, there is less likelihood of such confusion among the
expert buyers employed by department stores than among the persons who buy at department
stores.”).
100.
One might conclude, alternatively, that familiarity breeds inattention, of
course, and that expert buyers who are under pressure to work quickly or who have been
engaged in the selection process for long enough that they are inclined to take shortcuts might
be more likely to make a mistake when presented with two similar trademarks.
101.
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996).
102.
20 F. 883 (W.D. Ark. 1884).
103.
Id. at 884.
104.
Id. at 884–85.
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his favorite brand of champagne.”105 But that type of buying experience was not the
touchstone; rather, it is “the ordinary purchaser, purchasing as such persons
ordinarily do,” which involves “the character of the article, the use to which it is put,
the kind of people who ask for it, and the manner in which they usually order it.”106
Looking at the “sophistication of the consumer” factor through the lens of
the buying experience as opposed to any inherent qualities of the individual107 also
tells us something both about the nature of the harm at issue and about the interplay
of the other likelihood of confusion factors. If the harm at issue were simply
diversion of profits, a multifactor test would likely not be necessary. Instead, courts
could resort to a simpler “double identity” test, meaning that if defendant’s
trademark and good were identical to the plaintiff’s, one could reasonably assume
that consumers purchasing the good from the defendant had intended to buy from
the plaintiff, thus causing a loss of sales to the plaintiff. It is only when the goods
are unrelated that a different test is needed because the question has now become
whether the defendant’s typical consumer will change her evaluation of the
plaintiff’s reputation as a result of mistaken beliefs about the plaintiff’s association
with the defendant’s goods.108 To the extent that the harm is preventing the plaintiff
from expanding to provide the types of goods sold by the defendant, no assessment
of consumer confusion is necessary—all that is needed is an inquiry into how likely
that expansion is and whether equity requires that the plaintiff be permitted to
expand. (I should emphasize here that I am describing the harm as it has come to be
accepted by the courts and am making no normative claim as to what the harm of
trademark law should be.)109
Thus, in order to determine the likelihood of reputational association, and
thus reputational harm (again, taking as a given that this is the harm that courts
believe trademark law should address), the multifactor test must converge on the
singular question of the consumer experience in the marketplace. A court should not
consider, for example, the similarity of the marks as compared by the judge in the
courtroom; it should consider how the relevant consumer sees the marks in the
marketplace. Similarly, the quality of the defendant’s product should not be
considered in a vacuum—the question is whether the typical consumer encountering
the defendant’s product would view the product as of lower quality and therefore
reach a judgment about the reputation of the plaintiff. It is only in the context of the
105.
Id. at 885. The court used the phrase “intelligent user of tobacco,” but the
context suggests that it was not talking about the user’s educational capacity or cognitive
abilities apart from his experience with the product.
106.
Id.
107.
Lee et al., supra note 6, at 588 (“Consumers can be said to be ‘sophisticated’
when they have both the motivation and ability to exercise a high degree of consumer care
when performing the source-identification judgment.”).
108.
Note that because the Lanham Act does not provide for consumer standing,
the harm experienced by the consumer as a result of having been deceived into buying goods
that she assumed were associated with the plaintiff will go unaddressed, at least by trademark
law.
109.
For a discussion of the various theories of harm in trademark law, see generally
Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63
(2009).
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purchasing experience that “the sophistication of the consumer” has any meaning.
The conclusion to be drawn is not that educated consumers are careful and
consumers without formal education are careless; rather, the question is about how
the characteristics and experiences the consumer brings to the table affect her ability
to assess products in the marketplace and draw conclusions about their source.
Nevertheless, continuing with Second Circuit jurisprudence as an example,
courts seem to reflect considerable variance in how they discuss this factor. Some
cases, for example, equate the sophistication of the consumer with the price of the
product and assume that all consumers of low-cost products purchase those products
without much care. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc.110 was an
appeal from a district court opinion issuing a preliminary injunction barring the
defendant’s use of a particular trade dress for its nighttime pain reliever. Although
the Second Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction, it wrote approvingly of the
district court’s treatment of the “sophistication of the consumer” factor. The lower
court began by noting that this factor is generally related to consumer engagement
with the purchasing experience—that is, “whether consumers spend much time
evaluating the product before making a purchase or whether it is considered a ‘grab
off the shelf’ product.”111 The district court went on to note, however, that
“‘[c]ommon sense dictates that price is the crucial factor in ascertaining the depth
of attention the ordinary purchaser is likely to apply to a given purchase.’”112
Because the court determined that over-the-counter analgesics with a sleep aid were
“not major expenditures for most purchasers when buying the 24-caplet or tablet
size,”113 it concluded that this factor favored a likelihood of confusion.
The Second Circuit also equated the price of the item with consumer
sophistication. Even though it concluded that the prominent brand names featured
on each party’s trade dress would have been clear to “even ‘low involvement’
consumers,” it concluded that the lower court was not clearly erroneous in holding
that this factor favored a likelihood of confusion, given its finding that the products
were “relatively inexpensive” and that “consumers of non-prescription
analgesic/sleep aids [are] not typically careful or sophisticated in making their
purchases.”114
Another example is the district court’s discussion in Classic Liquor
Importers, Limited v. Spirits International B.V.,115 a dispute between two producers
of vodka, one using “elit by Stolichnaya” and the other, allegedly infringing, using
the mark “Royal Elite.” The court, quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, noted that,
110.
973 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1992).
111.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 211
(E.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Goya Foods,
Inc. v. Condal Distribs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[W]hen purchasing a
low-cost staple food item consumers often rely on color as they quickly grab the product off
the supermarket shelf.”); id. (distinguishing this conclusion from “direct evidence of the
sophistication of the relevant consumer group”).
112.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 786 F. Supp. at 213 (citing Brown v. Quiniou, 744 F.
Supp. 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
113.
Id.
114.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 973 F.2d at 1046–47.
115.
201 F. Supp. 3d 428, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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generally, the “‘more sophisticated and careful the average consumer of a product
is,’” the less likely it is that confusion would result.116 The producer of “Royal Elite”
vodka thus argued that because “elit by Stolichnaya” was a “high-end, expensive
product,” its consumers would be “more affluent and sophisticated” and,
presumably, less likely to be confused as between the two products. The court,
crediting the positioning of “elit by Stolichnaya” in the vodka market, found that
this factor favored the producer of “Royal Elite.”117
Other courts have linked sophistication directly to the income level of the
consumer, regardless of the cost of the good in question.118 One particularly
egregious example is from the district court’s 2017 decision in Coty, Inc. v. Excell
Brands, LLC,119 involving a dispute over “knockoff” versions of well-known
fragrances. The court, quoting from the parties’ jointly stipulated characterization of
the defendant’s consumers, mused that “it could be argued that [defendant’s] target
demographic, ‘lower income, sometimes ethnic customers’ (Stipulated Facts ¶38),
is likely to be less sophisticated about the differences between and among fragrances
and more easily confused upon seeing Excell’s cheaper knockoffs.”120 Another
116.
Id. at 450 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 973 F.2d at 1046).
117.
Id.; see also, e.g., Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country
Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Still another reason to expect confusion is
that both Cracker Barrel cheeses and most meat products that CBOCS has licensed for sale
to grocery stores are inexpensive — under $5. Generally only very cost-conscious consumers
are apt to scrutinize carefully the labels of the less expensive items sold in a grocery store.”);
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 390 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n some cases, a court
is entitled to reach a conclusion about consumer sophistication based solely on the nature of
the product or its price.”); Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305,
326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Because people generally exercise greater care in purchasing
expensive products than in purchasing cheap products, purchasers of expensive products are
usually less likely to be confused.”); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281
F.2d 755, 762 n.19 (2d Cir. 1960) (“[T]he normal buyer does not exercise as much caution in
buying an inexpensive article as he would for a more expensive one, making confusion more
likely.”).
118.
Lee et al., supra note 6, at 630 (citing cases in which courts left unquestioned
“the general premise that consumer care rises and falls with wealth or income”).
119.
277 F. Supp. 3d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
120.
Id. at 456 (finding infringement and rejecting nominative fair use defense).
Earlier courts were more direct about which consumers they believed had sufficient cognitive
capacity to avoid confusion. See, e.g., Helen Schy-Man-Ski & Sons v. S.S.S. Co., 73 F.2d
624, 625–26 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (“It seems quite evident that the tribunals in the Patent Office
came to the proper conclusion about this matter. It is apparent that if, in the same
establishment, bottles of the S.S.S. preparation were placed side by side with goods of the
same descriptive properties, as there are, in similarly shaped bottles marked ‘S.M.S,’ the
opportunities for confusion are very great. Especially is this true among the illiterate and
ignorant, and those who cannot be expected to exercise the same care and caution which might
be exercised by those of another degree of information or intelligence.”); Wolf Bros. & Co.
v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 206 F. 611, 615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff’d, 240 U.S. 251 (1916)
(“This court at that time had before it evidence showing that the name ‘American Lady’ was
adopted by the appellee at an assembly of its traveling salesmen and resulted from suggestions
made by them. These salesmen came from the same territory in which appellant’s shoes were
most largely sold. The original suggestion came from a salesman who traveled in Texas;
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example comes from the district court’s decision in Klein-Becker USA LLC v.
Product Quest Manufacturing Inc.,121 in which the court noted that the typical
purchaser of plaintiff’s skincare product was “45 years old or older, affluent and
educated” and thus less likely to be confused, particularly in light of the fact that
plaintiff’s product sold for more than five times the price of defendant’s product.122
A third, more recent example is Reflex Media, Inc. v. Luxy Limited, a case involving
competing dating websites and mobile apps. The court noted that such services
“attract two kinds of people”:
The first group is, theoretically, more sophisticated and less likely
to be confused since they are successful individuals looking for
relationships. But [the] second group, in theory, is less
sophisticated and just looking to find a way to “hook” up with
members of the first group. This latter group is less likely to
exercise care in which app they select to find potential mates.123
Other courts have taken a more nuanced view, focusing on the purchasing
experience more broadly rather than simply the cost of the goods in question or the
income level or other inherent characteristics of the consumer. For example, in New
York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc.,124 a dispute between two
organizations organizing competitive triathlons, the district court found that the
“sophistication of the consumer” factor favored the plaintiff not because of the cost
involved in participating in a triathlon but because a majority of the registrants for
the race were first-time participants and so were not deeply familiar with the mark;
in addition, the court noted, “even sophisticated triathletes [were] likely to be
confused” given the similarity between the names of the two organizations.125
Similarly, in a dispute between Reebok, the athletic shoe manufacturer, and the
retailer Kmart, the court rejected Reebok’s assertion that the low price of the
defendant’s shoes “attract[ed] an unsophisticated consumer” who would be likely to
engage in an impulse purchase:
The parties have not cited any case holding that the price of an item
along establishes a lack of care by consumers . . . . In addition, the
court cannot find that K-Mart [sic] customers, by definition, are
necessarily unsophisticated. It strikes the court as more than a little
elitist to believe that K-Mart shoppers fail to exercise care merely
because they shop at a discount store. The fact that a consumer may
prefer to purchase low-priced footwear (or have no other option) does
not transform that consumer into an unsophisticated, careless
shopper. In fact, an argument can be made that shoppers with limited
another Texas salesman and one from Arkansas were also present. It was disclosed in the
testimony that the largest sale of The American Girl shoes was among the negroes and
illiterate whites in the South; also that in this very territory actual confusion, which worked
greatly to the disadvantage of appellant, existed among purchasers.”).
121.
429 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Utah 2005).
122.
Id. at 1254.
123.
Reflex Media, Inc. v. Luxy Ltd., No. 2:20-CV-00423-RGK-KS, 2021 WL
4134839, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2021).
124.
704 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
125.
Id. at 320.
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budgets use more care in spending their more limited resources than
shoppers at non-discount stores.126

A similar view was reflected in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Frehling
Enterprises, Inc. v. International Select Group, Inc.,127 in which the circuit court
criticized the district court for dividing the consumer world into those who shopped
at Macy’s and those who shopped at Sears:
We are troubled by the district court’s methodology of dividing
up the world into distinct segments of “affluent” and “less
affluent” for the purpose of determining the balance of the
[sophistication] factor . . . . [A]ffluent people shop at Sears and
less affluent people shop at Macy’s. Hence, there would seem to
be overlap in customer base even though the retail outlets where
the parties’ products are sold are not exactly the same.128
The district court in Best Flavors, Inc. v. Mystic River Brewing Co.129 similarly
rejected the defendant’s argument that confusion was unlikely because its customers
were more “sophisticated” as measured by household income, age, and cultural
interests, noting, “That is not the kind of ‘sophisticated purchaser’ that courts have
in mind, however, when analyzing likelihood of confusion. That description applies
to people who have experience in purchasing a product and who care about their
purchase decisions; typically ‘high ticket’ items are involved.”130 More recently, the
district court in Easy Spirit, LLC v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that older women would not be sophisticated consumers of comfort shoes,

126.
Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 252, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
vacated by consent order sub nom. Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Kmart Corp., No. 92 CIV. 8871
(CHT), 1994 WL 733616 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1994); see also Kohler Co. v. Bold Int’l FZCO,
422 F. Supp. 3d 681, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[P]laintiff implicitly relies upon a theory of
consumer sophistication — i.e., that the less-than-affluent are unsophisticated — for which
this Court is, to say the least, highly skeptical.”); Bartow, supra note 5, at 772 (“It is certainly
possible that poor people are easily confused and unsophisticated in their purchasing habits.
It is at least equally plausible, however, that the exact opposite is true — that individuals with
few economic resources pay careful attention to how they spend their scarce and highlyvalued dollars, while wealthy people are comparatively more apt to spend small amounts of
money somewhat careless or recklessly.”); William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein,
Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Fiction
of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1229, 1263 (2004) (cautioning against
assumptions regarding price of products and relative care in purchase based on one’s own
experience).
127.
192 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1999).
128.
Id. at 1339 (citation omitted); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:51 (5th ed. 2017) (“[I]t may be difficult to
draw a line between those consumers who shop at ‘class’ retailers and those who shop at
‘mass’ retailers because of those consumers who ‘cross-shop’ and frequent both types of
retailers.”).
129.
886 F. Supp. 908 (D. Me. 1995).
130.
Id. at 916.
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noting it “borders on the offensive and, in any case, is at war with common
experience and common sense.”131
An interesting analysis was provided by another district court in the Second
Circuit in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. J-B Weld Company, LLC, a dispute between
two companies selling muffler crack sealant, one under the trademark “Muffler
Weld” and the other under the mark “MufflerWeld.”132 In analyzing the
sophistication of the consumers, the court first rehearsed the principle that the low
price of the product ($5.00 to $10.00) suggested a finding of “limited
sophistication.”133 But the court went on to consider the nature of the product, which
it said was “more equivocal”:
On the one hand, all muffler sealant does is seal cracks on
mufflers. This is not the kind of complex tool or object (such as a
muffler itself) that one would need to have high skill to apply: one
sees cracks on the muffler, one seals them. The instructions on the
products themselves appear to presuppose a limited degree of
sophistication. Both ITW and J-B Weld’s products claim on their
packaging that they can be applied in just three steps.
On the other hand, even setting aside potential
professional customers, it is a select audience bold enough to seek
to seal cracks in their own car muffler rather than entrusting their
unhappy automobile to the tender yet expensive care of the auto
repair professional. A degree of intrepidation, of particular
passion for the repair of complex machines, and an accompanying
obsessive attention to detail might be expected. I conclude that
this factor is neutral.134
This approach gets partly there. The court, to its credit, ultimately does not tie the
“sophistication of the consumer” factor to the cost of the product or the income level
of the consumer. But the court does still seek to characterize the consumer as either
a careless novice or a careful amateur repair technician without tying this
characterization to how it would relate to the experience in the marketplace. The
novice, aware of her own lack of experience in making repairs, might be more
attentive to researching and obtaining the right product than the confident amateur.
The characterization of the consumer takes on an additional valence when
it comes to purchasing products over the Internet. Courts’ assessment of consumer
engagement with trademarks on the Internet was initially more skeptical, with courts
tending to believe that a user momentarily taken astray by the use of another’s
trademark when conducting a search would either experience extraordinary
difficulty in getting back on course or would resign themselves to staying put and

131.
Easy Spirit, LLC v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 19-CV-3299 (JSR), 2021 WL
5312647, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021).
132.
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. J-B Weld Co., LLC, 419 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D. Conn.
2019), modified, No. 3:19-CV-01434 (JAM), 2019 WL 7816510 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2019).
133.
Id. at 400.
134.
Id.

368

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:339

satisficing.135 Courts have since evolved to conducting a more nuanced assessment,
recognizing consumers’ general familiarity with internet commerce and use of
search engines, including the possibilities of alternative suggestions provided by
search results.136 Nevertheless, courts do not typically take into account the way in
which some consumers access the Internet. As noted in Section I.B, a significant
percentage of consumers access the Internet primarily through mobile devices, and
many users do not have broadband access at home. Thus, if the determination of
consumer confusion on the Internet assumes a consumer sitting at home in front of
a laptop screen, and not a consumer using a public WiFi network on a mobile phone,
conclusions as to consumer perceptions may be distorted.
One last note relates to courts’ conceptions of what a reasonable consumer
does when faced with a mistaken purchase. Often arising during a consideration of
the “actual confusion” factor of the multifactor infringement test, such discussions
detail calls to customer service, counterfeit products brought to authorized retailers
for repair, or complaints on social media.137 Likewise, the absence of such evidence
can be seen as tipping this factor toward the defendant. This might be the right result
in most cases. But given that some consumers may not feel empowered to
complain—or have the resources to return to a store or send a frustrated email—it
might be worth it in relevant cases to consider other methods to determine whether
actual confusion has occurred.138
Overall, what one takes away from many courts’ discussions about the
“sophistication of the consumer” factor is a desire to essentialize consumers rather
than draw conclusions about the particular consumer experience at hand. The
phrasing thus can take on a paternalistic tone—if only consumers had been more
careful, or more sophisticated, or more educated, they wouldn’t have been taken in
by the defendant. But as the information detailed in Part I indicates, consumer
characteristics should be relevant not in determining whether they deserve
protection but in informing a view of the consumer experience. A consumer may
well lack formal education, but that fact does not necessarily mean that their
activities in the marketplace lie outside the bounds of what is reasonable. The
essentializing of the consumer in trademark law in service of understandable
administrative goals comes at a cost, a cost we should at least recognize even if we
can’t always take it into account.

135.
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999), is the case typically cited as an example for this point.
136.
See, e.g., Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 938–
40 (9th Cir. 2015).
137.
See, e.g., Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1253,
1271–73 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (discussing evidentiary value of calls and emails from customers
in determining existence of actual confusion).
138.
Cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.
1976) (“The value of evidence of actual confusion is greater when the products involved are
low value items because purchasers are unlikely to complain when dissatisfied, which would
bring to light confusion; but rather they are likely simply to avoid all products produced by
the company which they believe produced the product which caused them trouble.”).
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III. HOW TRADEMARK LAW ENGAGES WITH CONSUMER
CONSTRAINTS
Having considered both the experiences of some consumers and how courts
in trademark cases characterize the consumer more generally, I turn in this Part to
some of the implications of trademark doctrine in light of consumer constraints.
A. Analyzing the Similarity of Trademarks
In determining whether trademark infringement has occurred, one factor
courts consider is the similarity of the marks, the idea being that the more similar
the marks are, the more likely it is that a consumer will believe that the two goods
or services are related to the same source. Courts typically consider similarity along
the dimensions of sight, sound, and meaning—that is, not only how the marks appear
but also how they sound when spoken aloud or the meaning of the lexical
equivalents of the marks. For example, one court found that the marks CYCLONE
and TORNADO for wire fencing were similar despite their lexical differences
because both marks referred to strong wind conditions.139 A consumer in a store
intending to purchase CYCLONE fencing but seeing only TORNADO fencing
might have remembered only that the desired fencing had an association with wind
and thus believed that the TORNADO fencing was the one she wanted. Judges can
bring their own backgrounds and biases to the table regarding these dimensions,
such as finding no similarity between two marks if the pronunciation of the marks
is the result of “correct” or “careful speech.”140 Here, I want to highlight an
additional consideration: the way in which consumers without literacy in the English
language might interpret composite (or word-plus-design) marks.
Trademark doctrine typically directs that, when comparing the plaintiff’s
and the defendant’s marks, composite marks should be considered in their entirety
with respect to the impression they leave on the consumer. Nevertheless, if one
feature of a mark—the words or the design—dominates, courts can accord more
weight to that aspect of the mark in making their comparison.141 Thus, many courts
have given more weight to the word portion of the marks in question because of
their conclusion that the word is how consumers will order or talk about the product
139.
Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 737, 740–41 (C.C.P.A.
1953) (“[W]e think that contemporaneous use of appellant’s and appellee’s marks on wire
fencing is likely to result in confusion or mistake in trade, notwithstanding there is a
distinction between the technical meteorological meanings of the two terms. We are primarily
concerned with the meaning of the marks to members of the public at large who are
prospective purchasers of such wire, and not to meteorological experts.”).
140.
See generally Heymann, supra note 20.
141.
See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Miss. Pine Mfrs. Ass’n, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
364, at *4 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (“It is, moreover, a well settled principle of trademark law that, in
determining the question of confusing similarity, applicant’s mark must be considered in its
entirety. But, it is an equally well-established rule that one feature of a mark, whether a design
or a word, may by reason of its nature or manner of display, be the dominant or most
prominent feature thereof and may without doing violence to the aforementioned principle,
be given greater force and effect than other parts of the mark in resolving the question of
confusing similarity between it and another mark.”); id. (holding that tree design
predominated in both marks and so would likely be confusing).
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associated with the mark.142 This is, as J. Thomas McCarthy has termed it, a “literacy
presumption” in that it assumes that consumers will use the word portions of marks
to identify the products in question.143
But this is not necessarily how consumers lacking basic literacy skills in
English would interpret a mark. Such consumers might develop strategies of
pictographic thinking for identifying marks with letters. In other words, they might
treat a word mark as a design—not reading the word mark PEPSI but rather seeing
it as a design in which the first and third elements have a line on the left attached to
a round area on the right, and so forth—and then matching the shape of that design
from memory with what they see in the store.144 As one researcher described it, such
consumers recognize logos in the same way individuals might recognize people they
know in a photograph.145 One possible result, then, is that consumers with low levels
of literacy will see brand extensions (“Tide with Bleach Alternative” or “Coke
Zero”) as new and separate product categories altogether rather than as product
variations coming from the same source, depending on how the logo of the extension
is rendered.146
Additionally, consumers with low levels of literacy in English who focus
on designs or pictures on product packaging might sometimes interpret pictures as
having strong descriptive meaning, whereas a literate consumer might recognize the
same picture as a design element or as descriptive only in connection with related
text that provides the necessary information. Take, for example, a bottle of
household cleaner with a picture of a flower on it and the text “Acme Disinfectant
Spray Cleaner. Eliminates 95 Percent of Household Germs Without a Chemical
Scent!” A consumer literate in English would likely focus on the text on the bottle
142.
See, e.g., Arnold, Schwinn & Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 302 F.2d 765, 767–68
(C.C.P.A. 1962) (holding that because the goods at issue (bicycles) were typically bought by
name, “the [similar] designs serve primarily as the background for display of the words” and
rejecting the argument that designs should be given more weight because “the users of goods
of the type involved are children, many of whom cannot read,” in light of the fact that a parent
or another adult would be the purchaser). But see, e.g., King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that even if the word
portion of the defendant’s mark dominated, the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark as
whole were not confusingly similar given their two logos’ visual appearances).
143.
Professor McCarthy concludes, however, that the “literacy” presumption is “a
dubious generalization.” MCCARTHY, supra note 128, § 23:47.
144.
Viswanathan et al., supra note 70, at 21. To better understand this process, the
reader of this Article might consider a written language that they don’t read—for example,
Mandarin Chinese, Hebrew, or Arabic—and then consider how they might determine that two
written expressions in that language are in fact the same word.
145.
Id. See generally J. Colleen McCracken & M. Carole Macklin, The Role of
Brand Names and Visual Cues in Enhancing Memory for Consumer Packaged Goods, 9
MKTG. LETTERS 209 (1998) (studying the role of imagery on product packaging in enhancing
brand recall); Wee Loon Ng-Loy, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Likelihood of
Confusion: Consumer Psychology and Trademarks in an Asian Society, 98 TRADEMARK REP.
950, 960–63 (2008) (describing cases in Singaporean courts involving goods purchased by
consumers not literate in the language the word marks at issue were written in); id. at 967
(describing evolution of opinions as English literacy became more prevalent in Singapore).
146.
Viswanathan et al., supra note 70, at 27.
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to understand the nature of the product and interpret the flower image as either
functioning as a trademark or indicating that the product has a pleasant smell. A
consumer who is not literate in English, by contrast, might understand the graphic
to indicate a category of product rather than a characteristic—for example, that the
product is a type of air freshener or other product where the scent is the purpose of
the product.147 Thus, if a product or service might be purchased by a significant
number of consumers who are not literate in the English language, courts should
consider that consumers might engage with designs and information on product
labels and advertising in different ways from what courts might expect, based on the
judges’ own experiences. As one example, a district court considering an
infringement case in which customers tended to learn about the defendant’s services
“by word of mouth,” including nonliterate individuals who tended to “obtain
information orally,” emphasized the similarity in the sound of the marks as
supporting a finding of likelihood of confusion.148
Another doctrine that depends on consumer interpretation of trademarks is
tacking. Tacking allows trademark holders to vary a mark slightly over time without
losing protection so long as the mark creates the same continuing commercial
impression. The idea behind the tacking doctrine, presumably, is to allow
modernization and other small adjustments of a mark over time but without letting
trademark holders gain rights over an entirely new mark in the process. Accordingly,
courts have taken a narrow view of what constitutes the same continuing commercial
impression, denying the benefits of the tacking doctrine to mark holders who made
relatively small changes to the mark.149 As with composite marks, the comparison
of word marks that differ only slightly but convey the same meaning will likely not
pose an interpretive problem for consumers literate in the English language. But for
consumers who are not literate in the English language, and who use pictorial
methods of comparing word marks, even small changes might be interpreted as
completely different marks.150 And of course, for such consumers, thinking about

147.
Id. at 29. The authors note the implications for dangerous product misuse as a
result of this interpretation and encourage producers to rethink instructions and warnings on
packaging. Id. On the assumptions that tort law makes about whether consumers read,
understand, and comply with product warnings, see Latin, supra note 44, at 1196.
148.
See, e.g., Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. T&G Consultant Agency, LLC, No. 16-cv470wmc, 2016 WL 3830585, at *6 (W.D. Wis. July 12, 2016).
149.
See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that the standard is “exceedingly strict”); Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp.,
466 F.3d 749, 760 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying tacking of “QUIKSILVER ROXY” onto later use
of “ROXY”); Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (affirming TTAB’s rejection of attempt to tack “CLOTHES THAT WORK” to
“CLOTHES THAT WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO”). The Supreme Court has held
that whether an earlier trademark can be tacked to a later one is an issue of fact. Hana Fin.,
Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418, 426 (2015).
150.
Viswanathan et al., supra note 41, at 390 (“Functionally low-literate
consumers may treat store signs, brand names, and even frequently encountered numbers, as
if they are objects in a scene, ignoring much of the symbolic meaning behind these bits of
information. This may lead to confusion when physical features, such as the font style or
color, of familiar words and brands are changed.”).
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word marks along the Abercrombie spectrum,151 which determines distinctiveness
by asking about the semantic relationship between the word and the product or its
characteristics, may be entirely irrelevant to a consumer whose facility in reading
English presents a hurdle to the first step in understanding that relationship.152
B. Private Label Goods and Trade Dress Confusion
Consideration of the consumer experience is also relevant to how
trademark law thinks about private label goods. Also referred to as house brands or
store brands, private label goods are a mainstay for many large retailers, whether the
product is sold under the trademark of the retailer or whether the retailer establishes
its own mark for its private label goods. (In other words, MegaShop Supermarket
could sell paper towels under the MegaShop mark, or it could establish a private
label mark—MegaValue—that it would then presumably use across its entire line
of private label goods.) Philip Fitzell identifies Brooks Brothers as one of the oldest
private labels for men’s clothing, sold in the shop that has been called by the same
name since the early 1800s.153
In the mid- to late-eighteenth century, more manufacturers began to realize
the benefit of marketing their products under a separate mark and positioning those
goods as less expensive than the comparable national brands.154 Even though the
purchase of a store brand product presumably results in a lost sale of the national
brand product for the retailer (what one marketing article calls “cross-brand
cannibalism”), the result is that “the loyalty of the consumer is aligned with the
retailer rather than nationally branded products which can be purchased from a
number of differen[t] retailers.”155 Stores are able to sell private label goods at a
cheaper price because they are both manufacturer and retailer, but because they
don’t have the benefit of the national advertising conducted by the national brands,
they need to compete at the point of sale. This requires packaging that both attracts

151.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir.
1976).
152.
Indeed, the Abercrombie spectrum itself, by focusing on the relationship
between the word and the characteristics of the good or service, including whether the
relationship is metaphorical, depends not only on literacy but on a certain degree of
interpretive skills. See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1313, 1333 n.67 (2010) (“[A] court’s determination of whether a claimed mark is, for
example, suggestive may well depend on the vocabulary the court brings to the exercise,
knowledge that may or may not match that of the relevant consumer.”).
153.
PHILIP B. FITZELL, PRIVATE LABELS: STORE BRAND & GENERIC PRODUCTS 28
(1982).
154.
Id. at 32.
155.
Michael Harvey, James T. Rothe & Laurie A. Lucas, The “Trade Dress”
Controversy: A Case of Strategic Cross-Brand Cannibalization, 6 J. MKTG. THEORY & PRAC.
1, 12 (1998).
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and informs the consumer, in addition to adjacent shelf placement156 and circulars
and signage that makes the comparison between the products directly.157
Consequently, some private label brands have adopted packaging trade
dress that closely resembles that of the comparable national brand to easily indicate
similarity to the consumer and “reassure the customer by a consistent look that the
quality of the private label product is similar [to] or as good as the national brand,”
even if this might result in mistaken purchases or the absence of a unifying brand
identity for the private label.158 Some trademark owners, not surprisingly, have
opposed this practice, arguing that the similar trade dress confuses consumers into
thinking they were purchasing the name brand product; trademark owners also have
voiced concern that the proliferation of similar trade dress would result in dilution,
such that the trade dress would come to represent the category of product rather than
a single source.159
But for some consumers, the similar trade dress performs an informational
function—by adopting a similar trade dress, a private label manufacturer is able to
quickly and easily communicate to a consumer that the product is substantially the
same as (or, at least, comparable to) the name brand product. As one marketing study
put it:
A new brand of “baby shampoo” is more easily and
quickly categorized as a baby shampoo if it shares similarities to
baby shampoos already on the market. Therefore, if it is
advertised as “gentle” and is packaged in a clear yellow tearshaped bottle, consumers will quickly learn that it is a baby
shampoo and will presumably benefit from the similarities
between it and previously learned shampoos.160
Much like a parody that imitates a trademark in order to poke fun at it, the private
label product both is and is not the name brand product.161 Therefore, whether such
practices should be legally permissible depends on a determination both that
consumers will generally not be confused by the similarity in trade dress and,
perhaps, that such similarity results in more effective transmission of information

156.
See generally Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381
(2009) (discussing the ways in which shelf placement and other retailer decisions facilitate
product comparisons by consumers).
157.
FITZELL, supra note 153, at 46 (noting that the A&P stores in New Orleans
deployed one of the earliest price comparison ads between private label products and national
brands in 1936).
158.
Andrew W. Coleman, National Brands, Private Labels and Unfair
Competition — When Imitation Goes Beyond the Sincerest Form of Flattery, 87 TRADEMARK
REP. 79, 85–86 (1997).
159.
Id. at 110.
160.
Barbara Loken, Ivan Ross & Ronald L. Hinkle, Consumer “Confusion” of
Origin and Brand Similarity Perceptions, 5 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 195, 207 (1986).
161.
Bartow, supra note 5, at 766 (stating that “label and price disparities will
clearly signal the differences between the goods and sources to the vast majority of
consumers”).
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than, say, a simple textual legend on the competing product (“Compare to Brand
X”).
As marketing studies note, however, such determinations may be more
complicated with respect to consumers facing constraints. One study found that
consumers who have independent information about the similarity of the products—
for example, from professional education or experience—buy more store brands
over national brands, although this effect was seen more strongly in the study with
respect to health-related products, such as pharmaceuticals, than in food and drink
products.162 The authors drew from this study a suggestion to ameliorate this deficit
of information for other customers by using “copycat packaging” to signal similar
quality.163 But another study noted that consumers who are not otherwise educated
about the nature of private label brands may in fact conclude from the similarity in
trade dress that there is a relationship between the source of the two products—in
other words, that the similar trade dress conveyed contrary information to what was
intended.164 The needle to thread, then, is how to balance the informational value of
the similar trade dress.
Decisions in the federal courts involving private labels have reflected this
uncertainty. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, a 2007 Third
Circuit decision,165 involved a dispute between the producer of the artificial
sweetener Splenda and a manufacturer and distributor of private label brands for
grocery stores that used similar yellow packaging. In holding that, for many of the
house brands at issue, there was not sufficient similarity to find a likelihood of
confusion, the court noted that the prominence of the store’s house marks, which
consumers would presumably be familiar with and see on many other products,
militated against a finding of confusion (and, conversely, where the house mark was
not sufficiently prominent, the similarity supported a finding of confusion).166 For
162.
Bart J. Bronnenberg et al., Do Pharmacists Buy Bayer? Informed Shoppers
and the Brand Premium, Q.J. ECON. 1669, 1717 (2015). For an alternative theory about lowincome consumers and private labels, see Simba Pasirayi & Carola Grebitus, The Consumer
Paradox: Why Bottom-Tier Consumers Are Loyal to Brand Names, AAEA Annual Meeting
(2016) (manuscript at 5) (“[L]ow income consumers prefer national brands so as to associate
themselves with high-income households and to gain social status. In fact, their purchase
intentions and willingness to pay for private labels increase when they assume that high
income consumers consume private labels.”).
Of course, it is not always the case that generic pharmaceuticals are
trustworthy substitutes. See Farah Stockman, Our Drug Supply Is Sick. How Can We Fix It?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2021, at SR4 (“Competition for market share [of generic drugs] at rockbottom price points has led to chronic shortages, unpredictable price-spikes, allegations of
illegal price-fixing, and substandard and even dangerous practices.”).
163.
Bronnenberg et al., supra note 162, at 1718.
164.
Loken et al., supra note 160, at 206. The study’s authors note possible
limitations with the study, including the fact that the respondents were all marketing students.
Id. at 207–08.
165.
511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007).
166.
Id. at 361 (noting that “Food Lion” and “Safeway” house marks “are wellknown because they are well-known to the consumers who shop in the stores with those same
names” and that the marks featured prominently on the packages); id. at 367–68 (holding that
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the products at issue, the court also held that the district court did not err in
characterizing the relevant consumer as devoting “some heightened care and
attention” to the purchase “because her health considerations typically override the
products’ low cost.”167 The Federal Circuit reached much the same conclusion in
Conopco, Inc. v. May Department Stores Co. in 1994, in which it held that the
phenomenon of retailers marketing both national brands and their own private label
brands “has become commonplace and well-known in the marketplace,” such that
“[w]hen such packaging is clearly labelled and differentiated,” it should not be
presumptively unlawful.168 As in McNeil, the court held that consumers would have
come to be very familiar with the store’s own marks from its appearances “in the
store parking lot, on store signs, on employees’ badges,” in advertising, and on other
private label products.169
Not every court has been so persuaded, however. In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v.
Guardian Drug Company, Inc.,170 a dispute over the similar trade dress for a national
brand and a private label product for a digestive aid, the district court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the use of house marks and signage encouraging
customers to compare the products was sufficient to overcome any confusion arising
from the similarity in the trade dress; indeed, the court noted that if the defendant’s
goal had been merely to encourage comparison between the products, it would have
used a dissimilar trade dress.171 And in some instances, there is no nearby national
brand on the shelf to which the house brand is directly being compared, such as the
versions of name brand products that are sold at dollar stores using similar trade

the district court erred in finding no confusion where there was insufficient dissimilarity); id.
(“The danger in the District Court’s result is that producers of store-brand products will be
held to a lower standard of infringing behavior, that is, they effectively would acquire per se
immunity as long as the store brand’s name or logo appears somewhere on the allegedly
infringing package, even when the name or logo is tiny. The Lanham Act does not support
such a per se rule.”).
167.
Id. at 365.
168.
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
see also Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory’s Corp., 718 F. Supp. 389, 398–99 (D.N.J. 1989)
(“Furthermore, the price difference between the two products is not only a product difference
in itself, but also prompts McCrory to bring this price difference to the [consumers’] attention
through the prominent use of ‘compare and save’ signs on shelves in which the products
appear, further distinguishing the two products from each other in the minds of prospective
consumers. The Court also takes cognizance of the fact that a McCrory’s shopper, as with any
shopper in such a retail store chain, has likely been exposed to generic or discount house
brands before, and when walking through a McCrory’s store and observing the many
‘compare and save’ signs, is not likely to be misled by the McCrory’s mouthwash brand.”);
Klein-Becker USA, LLC v. Prod. Quest Mfg., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (D. Utah
2005).
169.
Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1568; see also Johnson & Johnson v. Actavis Grp. hf, No.
06 CIV. 8209 (DLC), 2008 WL 228061, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008), as corrected Feb.
21, 2008 (denying summary judgment motion of national brand).
170.
984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
171.
Id. at 1073.
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dress.172 The trade dress of such products is presumably intended to have the same
communicative effect as a private label product—to indicate similarity with the
known national brand—but they are typically missing the additional cues that courts
have found to dispel confusion (the house mark or “compare to” language), relying
solely on consumers’ memory of the name brand trade dress. In one such case, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found a likelihood of
confusion and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from using
the mark WIPE-OUT on its correction products sold in Dollar Tree Stores in light
of the plaintiff’s familiar WITE-OUT product.173
The takeaway from these cases seems to be a recognition of the ways in
which similar trade dress can serve an informational function for consumers but
typically only when there are sufficient other cues to ensure that consumers interpret
that information narrowly—that the products are purportedly similar in composition
or quality but not from the same manufacturer.174 (This result has some interesting
intersections with theories of initial interest confusion, in which the claim is that
using a similar mark or trade dress to draw consumers in, even if they understand
the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff at the time of purchase,

172.
As of 2018, there were 30,000 Dollar Tree and Dollar General stores in the
United States, combined, more stores than the six largest U.S. retailers combined (Costco,
CVS, Home Depot, Kroger, Walgreens, and Walmart). Warren Shoulberg, Are Dollar Stores
the True Retail Disrupters?, FORBES (July 22, 2018, 2:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
warrenshoulberg/2018/07/22/are-dollar-stores-the-true-retail-disrupters/#7471f0cd7a6e
[https://perma.cc/H5NH-NKB3]. Commentators have highlighted that dollar stores provide
inexpensive items to low-income individuals in food deserts but often do not provide a variety
of healthy food options and, according to one writer, are frequent targets of crime. See, e.g.,
Alec MacGillis, The Dollar-Store Deaths, NEW YORKER, July 6 & 13, 2020, at 20–26; Stacy
Mitchell & Marie Donahue, Dollar Stores Are Targeting Struggling Urban Neighborhoods
and Small Towns. One Community Is Showing How to Fight Back, INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE (Dec. 6, 2018), https://ilsr.org/dollar-stores-target-cities-towns-one-fights-back/
[https://perma.cc/QJ6K-BXK4]; see also Ronald Paul Hill, Stalking the Poverty Consumer:
A Retrospective Examination of Modern Ethical Dilemmas, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 209, 218 (2002)
(“The experiences of discount retail chains such as Dollar General provide an appropriate role
model of corporate as well as moral success.”).
173.
BIC Corp. v. Far E. Source Corp., No. 99 CIV. 11385 HB, 2000 WL 1855116,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2000), aff’d, 23 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2001).
174.
Haeran Jae & Devon Delvecchio, Decision Making by Low-Literacy
Consumers in the Presence of Point-of-Purchase Information, 38 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 342,
351 (2004) (“[G]iven adequate involvement, high-literacy consumers tend to choose products
based on central cues [such as printed information] while low-literacy consumers tend to
choose products based on peripheral cues [such as attractive packaging appearance]. This
results in substandard product choice by low-literacy consumers to the extent that peripheral
cues and product quality are inconsistent. The findings also indicate that presenting a visual
decision aid that summarizes written product information improves [but does not completely
eliminate] the ability of low-literacy consumers to make normative decisions.”).
This also gives rise to a question of whether courts should determine whether
the private label good is in fact similar to the brand name good and, if demonstrably not,
whether a remedy lies in trademark law or in false advertising law. See, e.g., Rexall Sundown,
Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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should be actionable.)175 Overall, this seems like a welfare-enhancing result. But we
should recognize, as with the other doctrines discussed in this Subpart, that for
consumers who don’t have sufficient familiarity with private label brands or who
don’t have fluency in written English, there may be more rather than less confusion
at the time of purchase without additional attention to informational cues.
C. Post-Sale Confusion and Luxury Goods
The previous discussion regarding private label goods takes us inevitably
into a discussion of luxury goods and the doctrine of post-sale confusion. As with
private label goods, the defendant in these cases is selling goods that resemble or
imitate the trade dress of a national brand. Here, however, the imitation is not of the
packaging, with the goal of communicating information to the consumer about the
quality of the good therein, but rather is of the configuration of the good itself,
typically a luxury good. For purposes of this discussion, we are assuming that
consumers who purchase the imitation luxury good are aware that they are not
purchasing the national brand; if that is not the case, liability for trademark
infringement should ordinarily result. Nevertheless, the theory of post-sale
confusion holds that liability should pertain regardless of confusion at the point of
sale when there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of those who may encounter
the imitation good at a later point in time by seeing the good being used by a
purchaser or encountering the good in a resale market.176
Notably, Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & ConstantinLeCoultre Watches, Inc.,177 the case that serves as the genesis of the theory, was not
concerned with the resale of such items to unsuspecting buyers. Rather, as several
scholars have pointed out, the Second Circuit was concerned that the purchaser of
an imitation luxury item was deceiving social associates into thinking that the
purchaser had the resources to purchase an authentic good.178 Thus, these scholars
have concluded, the doctrine is often about preserving a status system, and allowing
175.
Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.
2004) (“Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a
competitor’s product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest
confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore
actionable trademark infringement.”); see also Grynberg, supra note 24, at 104 (“[I]nitial
interest confusion’s potential costs should . . . be weighed against possible information
benefits to consumers of the challenged practice.”).
176.
MCCARTHY, supra note 128, § 23:7.
177.
221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
178.
Id. at 466 (“[S]ome customers would buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the
purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’
homes would regard as a prestigious article. Plaintiff’s wrong thus consisted of the fact that
such a visitor would be likely to assume that the clock was an Atmos clock.”); Rebecca
Tushnet, Stolen Valor and Stolen Luxury: Free Speech and Exclusivity, in THE LUXURY
ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 121, 123 (Haochen Sun et
al. eds., 2015) (“The condemnation of the copyist’s consumer is an important part of a finding
of infringement by the copyist because the consumer is not confused, but rather deviously
plotting to pose as wealthier or more tasteful than she actually is.”); Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen
Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 792 (2012) (noting that the relevant observers in “statusconfusion” cases “are confused about the consumers of the products, and specifically about
who is entitled to the high social status that the brand is supposed to impart”).
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makers of luxury goods to benefit from that system, rather than about preventing
deception in the marketplace.179 As the Second Circuit later wrote, “[T]he purchaser
of an original is harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because the high
value of originals, which derives in part from their scarcity, is lessened.”180
The benefits of allowing such imitations to exist, however, have been
variously characterized. Some scholars have contended that allowing imitation
luxury goods redounds to the benefit of the producer because once the look has
become accessible to the masses, the purchasers of the original, seeking uniqueness,
will need to acquire newer goods to remain distinctive.181 These scholars also note
that the purchasers of knockoff goods are not likely to be in the market for the
original in any event, so the producer is not likely to have lost any sales to the
knockoff producer.182 At least one court, by contrast, has contended that the
producer indeed suffers harm if the observer changes his or her view of the quality
of the goods (and is in the class of potential future purchasers).183 Both sides of the
debate, however, seem to assume that the focus should be whether there is any harm
to the producer—a view that is completely understandable given that the producer
is the one ostensibly complaining of harm. More attention to the value of the
purchase to the consumer, and some consumers in particular, however, might tip the
balance the other way.
When commentators write about the purchase of such items, it is often
assuming a Veblen-like characterization of the process—that such items are
designed to satisfy a psychological desire to belong to certain social groups or to
demonstrate an aspiration to join such groups. In other words, the assumption seems
to be that the benefit to the purchaser of these items is the acquisition of status in

179.
See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 51, at 852, 867; Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Rethinking Post-Sale Confusion, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 881, 898–900 (2018)
(discussing use of post-sale confusion theory to control scarcity of a branded good). For a
critique of legal protections of status through trademark law, see generally Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV.
195 (2007).
180.
Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.
2000).
181.
See generally, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687
(2006).
182.
See, e.g., id. But see Aaron Ahuvia, Giacomo Gistri, Simona Romani &
Stefano Pace, What Is the Harm in Fake Luxury Brands?: Moving Beyond the Conventional
Wisdom, in LUXURY MARKETING: A CHALLENGE FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 279, 281 (KlausPeter Widemann & Nadine Hennigs eds., 2013) (noting conflicting research on whether
buyers of authentic luxury goods and buyers of counterfeit luxury goods are separate groups
of people as well as conflicting research on the effect of counterfeit luxury goods on the brand
equity of authentic luxury goods).
183.
Hermès, 219 F.3d at 108.
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and of itself184 or engaging in identity formation and communication.185 But as
Tressie McMillan Cottom has described (and as noted above in Section I.A), such
purchases can also be much more utilitarian, designed to signal to gatekeepers that
one is entitled to a certain job or that one’s concerns should be given as much
attention as another individual’s; these purchases are designed to reassure such
decision-makers that the individual is trustworthy and familiar.186 Such consumers
can thus be in the position of being shamed by other consumers for purchasing
luxury items (wasting limited resources) and by courts for purchasing imitation
items (attempting to portray themselves as something they’re not). Courts, for their
part, might find it easier to characterize either purchasers or their community as
easily fooled rather than as strategic; the latter would suggest that such consumers
are consciously attempting to attain “unearned” status and thus are agents in the
deprivation of that status for those who “rightfully” purchased it.187 But as Jessica

184.
VEBLEN, supra note 14, at 103 (“No class of society, not even the most abjectly
poor, forgoes all customary conspicuous consumption. The last items of this category of
consumption are not given up except under stress of the direct necessity. Very much of
squalor and discomfort will be endured before the last trinket or the last pretence of pecuniary
decency is put away. There is no class and no country that has yielded so abjectly before the
pressure of physical want as to deny themselves all gratification of this higher or spiritual
need.”); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Let Them Eat Fake Cake: The Rational
Weakness of China’s Anti-Counterfeiting Policy, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 263, 281 (Haochen Sun et al. eds., 2015)
(“To be a true social welfare analysis, and not simply a measure of the preferences of rich
people, [the analysis] must also consider the welfare gains of less affluent consumers who are
priced into some simulacrum of status consumption by the presence of fakes. The balance
between status losses at the top and status gains for everyone else is not susceptible to
theoretical analysis — it must be measured empirically.”); Sheff, supra note 178, at 813 (“The
deception worked by status-confusion allows for the possibility that hierarchical social
status—and all that flows from it—might be allocated based on something other than
wealth.”); id. at 817 (“By regulating who may stake a claim to social status and who may
not—or, more specifically, by deputizing private parties to invoke the coercive power of the
law to do so—status confusion entangles the government in the zero-sum, perpetual
competition for social status.”); see also Francesca Gino et al., The Counterfeit Self: The
Deceptive Costs of Faking It, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 712, 712 (2010) (“We suggest that a product’s
lack of authenticity may cause its owners to feel less authentic themselves — despite their
belief that the product will actually have positive benefits — and that these feelings then cause
them to behave dishonestly and to view other people’s behavior as more dishonest as well. In
short, we suspect that feeling like a fraud makes people more likely to commit fraud.”).
185.
Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 458–62.
186.
COTTOM, supra note 62, at 152–69. Researchers have also noted that
adolescents in households facing economic hardship may respond to resulting feelings of
marginalization by seeking material displays of higher income. Hamilton et al., supra note
31, at 538.
187.
Cf. Grynberg, supra note 24, at 89 (“[A] maker of an imitation perfume who
uses the Chanel name in advertising looks more like a free rider than does the consumer who
wants an affordable scent that smells like Chanel. A court is therefore more likely to look past
the pejorative label to weigh the social value of the practice under a consumer-conflict
framework than the seller-conflict alternative.”).
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Litman has suggested, if the status-conferring benefit is “in some sense itself a
product,” then, absent any consumer confusion, “we want other purveyors to
compete in offering it to consumers in their own forms and on their own terms.
Competition is, after all, the premise of the system.”188
Finally, we should note that trademark law fully embraces the idea that the
sale of secondhand goods does not constitute trademark infringement (unless the
good is so fundamentally altered as to constitute a different product altogether).189
Third-party observers who see a used or shabby trademarked good might well draw
conclusions about the producer as a result. But this reputational harm is not
sufficient to justify a ban on the sale of secondhand goods; indeed, the doctrine is
justified on the grounds that the purchaser of a secondhand good knows exactly what
they are getting.190 The same can be said of an imitation leather jacket or cubic
zirconia earrings, despite the possibility that some observers might mistake them for
more expensive products.191 For some consumers, the same can be said of imitation
trademarked goods.

CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is modest. It does not call for a wholesale
reevaluation of trademark doctrine, and it might not be the case that a broader, more
inclusive consideration of consumer experiences will shift the result in any
significant way in any particular matter. If the target market largely comprises
consumers facing constraints, courts will have reason to be sensitive to those
constraints and how they affect the purchasing experience (and thus the likelihood
of confusion or dilution). But as a general matter, courts cannot easily calibrate the
nature of the remedy to different classes of consumers in a single case, and so there
will always be consumers in any litigation who are left behind.
But, at the very least, courts should consider who is being left behind in
these cases and whether judges’ and scholars’ conception of the reasonable
consumer is a consumer who more likely resembles themselves. This is a natural
impulse, particularly for those whose conception of the consumer as a rational

It should not be surprising that luxury brands, in response to this, devise ever
more ways to preserve signaling for those in the know (and with resources). See, e.g., Lisa
Lockwood, Balenciaga’s Hacker Project Launches Monday in Pop-ups Globally, WWD
(Nov. 12, 2021, 5:45 PM), https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/balenciagashacker-project-launches-monday-in-pop-ups-globally-1234996013/
[https://perma.cc/
W3Y5-2T2P] (describing Balenciaga’s “Hacker Project,” involving Balenciaga products
“that reinterpret Gucci codes and in so doing, question the idea of branding, appropriating
and counterfeiting”).
188.
Litman, supra note 55, at 1731.
189.
See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Nitro Leisure
Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
190.
Champion Spark Plug Co., 331 U.S. at 129–30 (“[I]nferiority is expected in
most second-hand articles. Indeed, they generally cost the customer less.”).
191.
Cf. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (noting that “[i]t is not at all unusual for a product to be designed to appear to viewers
to be something it is not,” such as imitation leather, and that the goal of imitation does not
deprive an invention of utility for purposes of patent validity).
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“sovereign,” to use Barton Beebe’s language,192 aligns with preferences regarding
the scope of trademark law itself. My goal here is not to challenge this conception—
indeed, in many instances, it is a commendable one. But we cannot ignore the way
in which public policy—how we address income equality, the availability of
broadband access, the layout of cities and bus lines—affects consumption. And so,
where possible, we should consider how trademark law, which is part of the way
that we legally govern the act of consumption, might take account of more
consumers in trademark cases. Perhaps we can do this through more nuanced
remedies to accommodate a wider variety of consumer experiences; perhaps the best
we can do is an acknowledgment that the consumers who will be on the losing end
of the decision are there not because they are foolish but because they are
disadvantaged. (As one example of a nuanced remedy, a court in a private label
goods case where significant numbers of disadvantaged consumers are among the
defendant’s consumer base could permit the defendant to continue using aspects of
the similar trade dress as an informational device but require clearer house marks or
other indicators that the good is not the plaintiff’s.) At the very least, those who
study consumer behavior with respect to trademarked goods in the United States
should be aware of the ways in which their subjects do and do not reflect the broad
range of consumer experiences across the country.
Ultimately, if courts had greater recognition of the wide variety of ways in
which consumers engage in the purchasing experience, they might rethink the
likelihood of confusion analysis writ large, moving away from an atomistic
consideration of factors and toward a more holistic approach. The “sophistication of
the consumer” factor is not about whether the consumer is clever or foolish, rich or
poor, careful or neglectful. It is about the extent to which the consumer is
empowered to adapt to the challenges of the modern marketing system. Courts
therefore shouldn’t reserve consideration of who the customers are for the
“sophistication of consumers” factor—it needs to be right up front, so that every
aspect of the purchasing experience is considered in that context.

192.

Beebe, supra note 2, at 2024.

